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Advisory Adjudication
Girardeau A. Spann*
The Supreme Court dedsion in Camreta v. Greene is revealing. The Court firSt issues an
opinion authorizing appeals by prevailing parties in qualified immunity cases, even though
doing so entails the issuance of an advisory opinion that is not necessmy to resolution of the
dispute between the parties. And the Court then declines to reach the ments ofthe underlying
constitutional claim in the case, because doing so would entail the issuance of an advisory
opinion that oos not necessmy to the resolution ofthe dispute between the parties. The Court's
decision, therefore, has the paradoxical efkct of both hononng and violating the Article 11!
junsdictionallimitation on adVIsOiy opi"nions at the same time. The Camreta paradox illustrates
a problem that makes our current conception ofjudicial review incoherent I* insist that the
Supreme Court avoid separation ofpowers problems by confimng itself to the retrospective
acfiudicatory actiVIties envisioned by the Marbury v. Madison dispute-resolution model of
judicial reVIew. But what we really want the Court to do IS participate In the prospective
!Onnulation ofgovemmental policy, as ifit were part ofa tncamerallegislative process. These
dual conceptions ofjudicia/ reVI·ew reflect a tension inherent 1n liberalism itself We want both
to advance our own self-interests in an unflattering pluralist politicalprocess, but simultaneously
we wish to think ofourselves as other-regarding adherents to Jollier civic republican virtue. ~
ask the Supreme Court to mediate this tension !Or us by malang our liberal political victories
look as if they are rooted in deeper communitarian principles. But this mediation can be
successfUl only to the extent that the Court can mask !Or us the underlying incoherence of the
judicial review limction that we ask the Court to ped"onn. In Carnreta, this incoherence is so
close to the swface that, hopefUlly, we will be forced to confivnt it Without the camouflage that
we ask judiCial review to proVIde !Or our baser instincts, perhaps we Will come to treat each
other Jess harshly, and with more empathy
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I.

INTRODUCTION

A.
B.

IY.

Sometimes a United States Supreme Court decision is
reminiscent of a Robert Frost poem. It starts out by focusing on a
particular incident, but ends up prompting an insight about some larger
truth. 1 That is the way I felt about the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Camreta v. Greene. 2 The decision starts out by addressing a dispute
between the parties, but ends up prompting a larger insight about the
nature of judicial review. The insight is that the institution of judicial
review is largely incoherent.
In Camreta, government officials interviewed a nine-year-old
elementary school girl in an effort to determine whether she was being
sexually abused by her father. Her mother then sued the officials for
damages, claiming that the interview violated her daughter's Fourth
Amendment rights. The government prevailed in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit when that court found that the
government officials were protected by qualified immunity. The
curious Supreme Court decision that followed was issued not at the
behest of the mother who had lost below, but at the behest of the
prevailing government officials who preferred to win on the merits of
the Fourth Amendment issue. But after holding that the Article III
prohibition on advisory opinions did not preclude the Court from
granting the request of the officials for prospective Fourth Amendment
guidance, the Court nevertheless dismissed the appeal under Article III
asmooe
If an advisory opinion is understood in its conventional sense as
the adjudication of a legal issue that is not necessary for resolution of
the dispute between the parties, the Supreme Court decision in
I.
For example, the well-known Robert Frost poem Stopping by Woods on a Snowy
Evem'ng, which many of us first encountered as schoolchildren, begins by describing the
seemingly innocuous incident referred to in the poem's title, but ends up prompting an insight
about the nature of life itself. See Robert Frost, Stopping by Wood5 on a Snowy Evening, in
THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST 224-25 (Edward Connery Lathem ed., 1969).
2.
131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
3.
See id at 2027-29, 2033-34.
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Camreta is quite remarkable. In essence, the Supreme Court issued an
advisory opinion holding that it had jurisdiction to review advisory
opinions that were issued by lower courts in qualified immunity cases.
But after having done so, the Court seemingly went on to hold that the
Article III prohibition on advisory opinions prevented the Court from
issuing the very advisory opinion that the Court itself had just issued.
This dizzying self-referential paradox is more than just puzzling. It
prompts the insight that judicial review cannot actually serve the
constitutional function that we have traditionally envisioned for it.
Under our tripartite system of government, we normally think
that the Supreme Court is institutionally competent to resolve concrete
disputes between the parties. However, the very insulation from
political accountability that is commonly thought to make the lifetenured federal judiciary a trustworthy arbiter of individual disputes
also leaves it institutionally ill-suited to the formulation of prospective
governmental policy. To avoid this countermajoritarian difficulty, we
therefore allocate such legislative policy-making functions to the
politically accountable branches of government. Consistent with our
commitment to separation of powers, the Article III-based prohibition
on advisory opinions is intended to confine the practice of judicial
review to the dispute-resolution arena and to prevent it from seeping
into the realm of legislative policy making. This constitutional
aversion to advisory opinions is traceable to the model of judicial
review articulated in Marbwy v. Madison. 4 But the Marbwy model
has become so porous that it is unrealistic to believe that it can actually
prevent judicial review from infiltrating the policy-making process.
And there is a reason for that.
Article III considerations aside, we have never really viewed the
Supreme Court as a dispute-resolution body. From the Marshall
Court's Commerce Clause decisions addressing the scope of federal
power/ to the Roberts Court's campaign finance decisions addressing
the scope of corporate power,6 we have always expected the Supreme
Court to engage in prospective social policy-making activities
concerning controversial political issues. Indeed, our reliance on the
Court to resolve stubborn social policy issues has become so prevalent
that the Court can plausibly be viewed as the final policy-making
chamber of a tricameral legislature-a chamber whose members
simply have longer terms of office than other officials, and whose
4.
5.
6.

5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824).
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).

1292

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1289

constituents simply prefer their policy preferences to be articulated as
outgrowths of foundational principles. Accordingly, the concurrence
of the Court-like the concurrence of the House, the Senate, and
typically the President-is required before social policies affecting
issues such as school prayer, abortion, and affirmative action can take
effect. The fact that judicial policy making is clothed in the garb of
constitutional adjudication, addressed to particular disputes between
particular parties, does not negate the fact that Supreme Court
decisions are useful primarily for their general, prospective effect. We
affirmatively want the Supreme Court to issue advisory opinions so
that we can rely on the policies advanced by those opinions to order
our everyday lives-just as we rely on the policies advanced by other
conventional legislative enactments to give us prospective guidance.
The Camreta decision exemplifies the incompatible demands that
we make on judicial review. Realizing that separation of powers
concerns limit legitimate adjudication to the retrospective resolution of
particular cases and controversies, the Court invokes the doctrine of
mootness to refrain from issuing an advisory opinion in a dispute that
7
it no longer views as live. But realizing that the value of judicial
review lies precisely in its prospective policy prescriptions, the Court
issues an advisory opinion "holding" that the Court has jurisdiction to
issue advisory opinions when the need for prospective guidance is
sufficiently high. 8 Then, as if to dispel the suspicion that Camreta
might be an isolated anomaly, the Supreme Court went on to issue
other advisory opinions during the same Term. 9
Don't get me wrong. I am not suggesting that the Supreme Court
should choose one model of judicial review and simply stick to it. 10 On
7.
SeeCamreta, 131 S.Ct.at2033-34.
8.
See 1d at 2029.
9.
See in/ro Part II.B.
I 0. In my youth, I did suggest that the Supreme Court should adopt an "expository"
model of judicial review that would provide the culture with advice about the operative
meaning of its fundamental values at particular points in the culture's evolution. See
Girardeau A. Spann, Expository Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 585, 585-87 (1983). I have since
become less sanguine about the expository benefits of judicial review. See, e.g., GIRARDEAU
A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT & MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICA 1-6 (1993) (suggesting that one function of the Supreme Court is to facilitate the
oppression of racial minorities). However, I continue to believe that the primary effects of
judicial review are intended to be prospective rather than retrospective, see Spann, supra, at
613-17, although I no longer view the supposed distinction between judicial exposition and
legislative policy making as viable. Cf. id at 635-36. For an example of a commentator who
continues to take the Marbury model very seriously-along with the model's prohibition on
unnecessary advisory opinions in constitutional cases, including cases that involve qualified
immunity-see Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L.
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the contrary, my point is that our sincere expectations for judicial
review are themselves internally inconsistent. We want the Court to
formulate prospective social policy for us, but simultaneously to
convince us that it is merely applying the Constitution in a
retrospective, nonpartisan way. There is an advantage in asking
judicial review to serve this dual function.
Reflecting a dilemma inherent in liberalism, we are often
confronted with the conflict that exists between our liberal inclinations
to pursue pure self-interest through a commitment to pluralist politics,
and our other-regarding inclinations to pursue collective welfare
11
through a commitment to classical republican civic virtue. One way
to help mediate this conflict is by asking the Supreme Court to do it for
us. When the Court rules in our favor, it enables us to believe that the
pluralist special interests we successfully lobby the Court to adopt in
its tricameral policy-making capacity are actually rooted in the
republican constitutional principles that the Court announces in its
adjudicatory dispute-resolution capacity. These dual functions of
judicial review can help us advance our own interests at the expense of
others, while believing that we are doing something that is
constitutionally noble rather than something that is selfishly political.
However, judicial review can successfully serve this dual function only
to the extent that we can suppress our own recognition of what is going
on.
I think that cases like Camreta are useful precisely because they
put enough strain on the Marbwy-based adjudicatory model of judicial
review to challenge our continued adherence to that model. When we
adopt social policies that advance our own self-interests at the expense
of others, simply because we possess the political power to sacrifice
those other interests for our own well-being, we should at least
recognize that this is what we are doing. If we can come to appreciate
the incoherence produced by the conflicting demands that we place on
judicial review, my hope is that we will no longer make the mistake of
thinking that judicial review can somehow save us from the
implications of our own parochial policy preferences.
Part II of this Article describes the doctrinal difficulties that are
embedded in the Supreme Court's Camreta dalliance with advisory
opinions. Part II.A discusses the doctrinal paradox created by the
REV. 847, 848-58, 935-36 (2005) (arguing that the current trend toward increased advisory
opinions has the effect of increasing judicial power).
11. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 19-21, 24-29 (6th ed.
2009).
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Camreta Court's application of the advisory opinion rule. Part II.B
discusses other advisory opinions issued the same Term that implicate
the Camreta paradox. Part III describes the manner in which
Camreta's doctrinal difficulties reflect the inconsistent demands that
we place on the conventional model of judicial review. Part liLA
discusses the constitutional underpinning of the adjudicatory model of
judicial review that emanates from Marbmy v. Madison. Part III.B
argues that, despite the constraints of the Marbmymodel, we still favor
prospective judicial policy making as part of what amounts to a
tricameral legislative process. Part N considers why we remain
attracted to the Marbmy model of judicial review, despite the elusive
distinction that exists between retrospective judicial adjudication and
prospective legislative policy making. Part IY.A suggests that our
adherence to the Marbmy model reflects the liberal dilemma inherent
in our efforts to be both self-interested and other-regarding. Part IY.B
argues that by appreciating rather than suppressing the incoherence of
the Marbmymodel, we may evolve to a postliberal stage of evolution
in which we are better able to accept accountability for the policies that
we impose on one another. The Conclusion, however, fears that the
convenient insulation from accountability that is offered by the
safeguard of judicial review may be so appealing that we will simply
deflect any insights about the incoherence of the conventional model
with which we are confronted.
II.

ADVISORY OPINIONS

The Article III limitation of federal court jurisdiction to "Cases"
and "Controversies" has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to
prohibit the issuance of advisory opinions. 12 An advisory opinion has,
in turn, been held to entail the adjudication of an issue whose
resolution is not necessary to settle a dispute between the parties. 13 In
Camreta v. Greene, the Supreme Court issued an advisory opinion that
was not necessary to settle a dispute between the parties, and it did so

12. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94, 96 (1968); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.
ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 50-54 (6th
ed. 2009); STEWART JAY, MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS: THE ADVISORY ROLE OF EARLY JUDGES
113-48 (1997); Spann, supra note 10, at 589-90, 617, 632-35; Note, Advis01y Opinions and
the Influence of the Supreme Cowt over Amencan Policymaking, 124 HARV. L. REv. 2064,
2066-69 (20 11 ).
13. See, e.g., FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 50-54, 70-73 (discussing the link
between the prohibition of advisory opinions and the dispute-resolution model of judicial
review); see also Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945) (emphasizing necessity to
decision).
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in a case that the Court went on to hold it lacked Article III jurisdiction
to review. 14 Whether or not two wrongs can ever make a right, in this
instance two wrongs did make a paradox. The Court both issued and
refused to issue an advisory opinion in the same case. Moreover, the
Supreme Court's advisory opinion problem is not limited to Camreta
alone. Other decisions issued by the Court that same Term illustrateand even require-the issuance of advisory opinions in seeming
violation of the Article III prohibition.
A.

Camreta Paradox

The dispute before the Court in Camreta involved contested
claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out of alleged
constitutional violations, and pendant claims for damages arising out
of state tort law violations. In the process of resolving that dispute, the
United States District Court for the District of Oregon, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the Supreme Court
all issued opinions that were in increasingly greater tension with the
Article III prohibition on advisory opinions.
1.

Factual Context

After a nine-year-old girl referred to as "S.G." was interviewed in
an Oregon elementary school by public officials, S.G.'s mother Sarah
filed a damage action asserting that the interview violated a variety of
constitutional and state law tort rights possessed by S.G. and her
family. Most prominent among these was the Fourth Amendment right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, which Sarah
claimed had been violated when S.G. was interviewed without a
warrant, probable cause, exigent circumstances, or parental consent. 15
The reason S.G. had been interviewed was that Oregon state and
county officials feared that S.G. and her five-year-old sister K.G. were
being sexually abused by their father Nimrod. Nimrod had been
arrested on February 12, 2003, for suspected sexual abuse of an
unrelated seven-year-old boy referred to as "F.S." In connection with
that arrest, the parents of F.S. reported that Sarah herself was
concerned about Nimrod's potential sexual abuse of their own
14.
See 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
15. The Supreme Court briefly discussed the facts in Camreta. Id at 2027-28. A
fuller discussion of the facts is set out in the court of appeals opinion, Greene v. Camreta
(Greene I I), 588 F.3d 1011, 1016-20 (9th Cir. 2009), and the district court opinion, Greene v.
Camreta (Greene 1), No. Civ. 05-6047-AA, 2006 WL 758547, at *1-2 (D. Or. Mar. 23,
2006).
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children, S.G. and K.G. As part of the ensuing investigation, S.G. was
interviewed on February 24, 2003, by Oregon Department of Human
Services Child Protective Services caseworker Camreta, in the
presence of Deschutes County Deputy Sheriff Alford. The two-hour
interview was conducted while S.G. was at school, in the apparent
hope of getting S.G. to speak freely in the absence of her parents.
During the interview, S.G. initially denied that her father had abused
her, but she eventually stated that her father did sometimes touch her in
inappropriate ways while he was intoxicated. Subsequent to that
S.G. stated that she felt
interview, however, S.G. recanted.
uncomfortable and intimidated during the interview and that she told
Camreta what she thought he wanted to hear in order to be allowed to
leave. 16
On March 6, 2003, S.G.'s father Nimrod was indicted for six
17
counts of felony sexual assault against F.S. and S.G. At the close of
Nimrod's trial for sexual assault against F.S. and S.G., the jury failed to
reach a verdict. In lieu of a retrial, Nimrod accepted an Alford plea
with respect to the charges concerning F.S., and the charges
18
concerning his daughter S.G. were dismissed. Sarah then filed an
action in federal district court against a variety of defendants,
including caseworker Camreta and Deputy Alford. Sarah sued on
behalf of herself and her daughters S.G. and K.G. She alleged
unconstitutional and state tort law interference with their collective
familial rights, as well as unconstitutional interference with S.G.'s
Fourth Amendment rights. Nimrod did not sue. 19
2.

Lower Courts

The district court rejected Sarah's claims on the merits and
entered summary judgment for defendants Camreta and Alford. 20 The
district court also held that Camreta and Alford were entitled to
qualified immunity even if their interview ofS.G. could be viewed as a
Fourth Amendment violation. Qualified immunity was available,
16.
See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2027; Greene II, 588 F.3d at 1016-17; Greene I, 2006
WL 758547, at*l-2.
17.
See Greene II, 588 F.3d at 1018; Greene I, 2006 WL 758547, at *2.
18.
See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2027; Greene II, 588 F.3d at 1020. An Alford plea
maintains innocence, but admits the existence of sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction.
See Greene II, 588 F.3d at 1020 n.3 (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)).
This "Alford" bears no relation to Deputy Sheriff Alford in Camreta.
19.
See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2027; Greene II, 588 F.3d at 1020; Greene I, 2006 WL
758547, at * 1-9 (discussing constitutional and state tort law claims).
20.
See Greene I, 2006 WL 758547, at *1-9.
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notwithstanding a hypothetical violation of the Fourth Amendment,
because no law clearly established that the interview was
impermissible, and reasonable officials could have believed that such
an interview was lawful. 21
In theory, the district court opinion could be said to pose an
advisory opinion problem. Either the court's Fourth Amendment
adjudication or its qualified immunity adjudication could technically
be viewed as an impermissible advisory opinion. Because either was
alone sufficient to dispose of the damage claim at issue, the court's
resolution of the other issue was arguably unnecessary to settle the
dispute between the parties. However, alternative holdings adjudicated
by lower courts are not typically viewed as impermissible advisory
opinions.22 Perhaps this is because both holdings are potentially
necessary to the court's decision. If a lower court is later reversed on
one issue by an appellate court, the alternative holding can still serve
as a basis for affirming the lower court judgment. Therefore,
considerations of judicial economy in resolving the dispute between
the parties might justify any technical incursion on the advisory
opinion rule that would otherwise be of concern. If this view is
accepted, all of the issues that the district court addressed fall within an
expansive understanding of what was necessary to resolve the disputed
damage claim. Moreover, the district court was careful to deny those
motions that it deemed to be moot, thereby further avoiding any
additional advisory opinion problems. 23
From an advisory opinion perspective, the decision of the court
of appeals was far more problematic. The appeal to that court had
been filed by Sarah, who lost in the district court below, and the court
of appeals reversed the district court on the merits of Sarah's Fourth
Amendment claim. The court of appeals held that the interview of
S.G. at school was so entangled with the ongoing criminal
investigation of Nimrod that conducting the interview without Fourth
Amendment protections constituted an unreasonable seizure.24
However, the court of appeals ultimately affirmed the district court
judgment granting qualified immunity to Camreta and Alford, because

21.
22.
(1994).
23.
24.

See id. at *4-5.
See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2040-49
See Greene I, 2006 WL 758547, at *9 (denying motion to strike).
See Greene II, 588 F.3d at 1021-30.
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it agreed that the Fourth Amendment law prohibiting S.G.'s interview
was not clearly established at the time that the interview occurred. 25
Like the district court, the court of appeals adjudicated both the
merits of the Fourth Amendment claim and the availability of the
qualified immunity defense. Unlike the district court, however, the
court of appeals could not maintain that it was merely issuing
alternative holdings. Affirming the district court judgment on
qualified immunity grounds completely resolved the dispute between
the parties. And the court's additional decision upholding the Fourth
Amendment claim could not have been an alternative holding because
it did not support the court's judgment. That judgment reyectedSarah's
damage claim, and the Fourth Amendment ruling provided a basis for
upholding the claim. As a result, the Fourth Amendment ruling issued
by the court of appeals was a pure advisory opinion, issued for reasons
other than resolving the dispute between the parties. In the words of
the Ninth Circuit itself, the Fourth Amendment decision was issued "to
provide guidance to those charged with the difficult task of protecting
child welfare within the confines of the Fourth Amendment," because
"although other circuits have provided guidance to parents, school
officials, social workers, and law enforcement personnel on the issue,
we have not."26
In fairness to the court of appeals, it was not breaking new
ground by adjudicating the Fourth Amendment claim. Rather, its
adjudication of that claim had been expressly authorized by the
Supreme Court.27 In fact, the Supreme Court's 2001 decision in
Saucier v. Katz actually required lower courts to adjudicate the merits
of the constitutional claims asserted in qualified immunity cases, in
28
order to promote "the law's elaboration from case to case." The
Court's more recent 2009 decision in Pearson v. Callahan now gives
lower courts discretion in deciding whether to resolve the
constitutional issues presented in such cases. 29 But Pearson still
authorizes the issuance of advisory opinions.
This Supreme Court authorization was designed to solve a
particular, practical problem. If the advisory opinion rule were strictly
applied in qualified immunity cases, there would rarely be an occasion
25.
26.
27.
28.
(2011).
29.

Sec:Jd at 1030-33.
/d at 1021-22.
See 1d
533 U.S. 194,201 (2001); see a/soCamreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020,2031-32
555 u.s. 223 (2009).
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for a federal court to resolve the merits of a novel constitutional claim.
Recognition of qualified immunity would preclude the court from
addressing the novel claim the first time it was raised, which in turn
would prevent the claim from becoming "clearly established" enough
to override a qualified immunity claim in the next case that considered
it. This process would go on indefinitely, in a way that left government
officials without the constitutional guidance needed to prevent them
from repeatedly violating novel but valid constitutional rights. 30
Because the rights would never become sufficiently established to
penetrate the qualified immunity defense, the development of
constitutional law would remain "permanently in limbo."3 ' The lower
courts, therefore, had the Supreme Court's blessing in issuing their
Fourth Amendment advisory opinions. But the Supreme Court's own
advisory opinion in Camreta is considerably more difficult to fathom.
3.

Supreme Court

One of the most noteworthy features of the Supreme Court
decision in Camreta is that it was issued at the behest of the parties
who prevailed in the court of appeals, and not at the behest of the party
who lost. Although Sarah's damage claim was rejected by the Ninth
Circuit on qualified immunity grounds, Sarah did not seek review of
that decision. Instead, the Supreme Court granted review based on
petitions for certiorari that were filed by Camreta and Alford-the
prevailing officials who had conducted the in-school interview of S.G.
Those officials wanted to win on the merits of the Fourth Amendment
issue, rather than simply on qualified immunity grounds, because they
wanted to establish the constitutional validity of such in-school
interviews in order to guide their actions in future cases.32 The
petitioners, therefore, were expressly asking the Supreme Court to
issue an advisory opinion.
The Supreme Court held that Article III did not prohibit
prevailing parties from obtaining such advisory opinions. Writing for
a five-Justice majority, Justice Kagan stated that an immunized official
could still possess an interest in the outcome of a litigated issue. She
also cited two precedents in support of the proposition that appeals by
prevailing parties could satisfy the Article III case or controversy

30.
31.
32.

See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at2030-33.
Id at 2031.
See 1d at 2028.
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requiremene 3 This holding seems to have been motivated by Justice
Kagan's desire to avoid an unintended consequence of the Saucierand
Pearson decisions, which authorized lower courts to issue Fourth
Amendment advisory opinions in qualified immunity cases. If
prevailing parties were not permitted to seek review, those advisory
opinions could be shielded from the Supreme Court in cases like
Camreta, where the losing party chose not to appeal. It is also possible
that Camreta's authorization of prevailing-party appeals was a
compromise designed to secure the votes of Justices who were
prepared to overrule Saucier and Pearson in order to prevent lower
courts from being able to issue Fourth Amendment opinions that the
Supreme Court would not have the ability to reverse. 34
Justice Kagan, however, did go on to stress that Article III
required both parties to retain a personal stake in the outcome
throughout the course of the litigation. She stated that a party has such
stake when that party has "'suffered an injury in fact' that is caused by
'the conduct complained of' and that 'will be redressed by a favorable
decision."' 35 The language that Justice Kagan used to describe how
both parties could retain the requisite Article III stake in the outcome is
here reproduced in its entirety:
This Article III standard often will be met when immunized officials
seek to challenge a ruling that their conduct violated the Constitution.
That is not because a court has made a retrospective judgment about the
lawfulness of the officials' behavior, for that judgment is
unaccompanied by any personal liability. Rather, it is because the
judgment may have prospective effect on the parties. The court in such
a case says: "Although this official is immune from damages today,
what he did violates the Constitution and he or anyone else who does
that thing again will be personally liable." If the official regularly
engages in that conduct as part of his job (as Carnreta does), he suffers
injury caused by the adverse constitutional ruling. So long as it
continues in effect, he must either change the way he performs his
duties or risk a meritorious damages action. Ci id [Deposit Guar. Nat'l
Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980)], at 337-338, 100 S.Ct. 1166
(discussing prevailing party's stake in a ruling's prospective effects).
Only by overturning the ruling on appeal can the official gain clearance
33.
See id at 2028-29 (citing Deposit Guar. Nat'! Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 332336 ( 1980); E1ec. Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 ( 1939)).
34.
Cf 1d at 2043 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (suggesting that lower court authorization
to issue Fourth Amendment advisory opinions might have to be reconsidered); accord 1d at
2036 (Scalia, J., concurring).
35. Jd at 2028 (majority opinion) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560-61 (1992)).
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to engage in the conduct in the future. He thus can demonstrate, as we
demand, injury, causation, and redressability. 4 And conversely, if the
person who initially brought the suit may again be subject to the
challenged conduct, she has a stake in preserving the court's holding.
See Ede v. Pap's A.M, 529 U.S. 277, 287-289, 120 S.Ct. 1382, 146
L.Ed.2d 265 (2000); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318-323, 108 S.Ct.
592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988); cf. [Los Angeles v.] Lyons, 461 U.S. [95],
at 111, 103 S.Ct. 1660 [(1983)] (examining whether the plaintiff had
shown "a sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a
similar way"). Only if the ruling remains good law will she have
36
ongoing protection from the practice.

There are three problems with Justice Kagan's Article III
discussion. First, the desire of parties for prospective constitutional
guidance standing alone is typically not sufficient to create an Article
III case or controversy. Second, it is difficult to see how a party
adversely affected by a lower court decision retains an Article III stake
in the outcome of the decision if that party has chosen not to appeal.
Third, Justice Kagan's Article III discussion was paradoxically part of
an advisory opinion that the Camreta Court itself lacked Article III
jurisdiction to issue.
a.

Prospective Guidance

The advisory opinion prohibition of Article III does not seem to
tolerate a party's bare request for prospective legal guidance. Just as
the first Supreme Court famously declined to give requested legal
advice to President George Washington in the absence of a live case or
controversy,37 the Court cannot properly give legal advice to
immunized officials concerning the Fourth Amendment validity of inschool student searches in the absence of a live case or controversy.
Justice Kagan's quoted language concedes that Carnreta and Alford
ceased to possess a personal stake in Sarah's damage claim once that
claim had been resolved in their favor by the Ninth Circuit's qualified
36. Id at 2029. Footnote 4 stated, "Contrary to the dissent's view, the injury to the
official thus occurs independent of any future suit brought by a third party. Indeed, no such
suit is likely to arise because the prospect of damages liability will force the official to change
his conduct." Id at 2029 n.4 (citation omitted).
3 7. In 1793, Chief Justice John Jay's Supreme Court declined to answer a series of
abstract international law questions posed by President Washington on the grounds that the
Court was precluded from issuing what we now characterize as advisory opinions. See
FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 50-54. The advisory opinion prohibition on federal
jurisdiction has been repeatedly enforced ever since. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2037-38
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing advisory opinion cases); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95-96
(1968); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1911).
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immunity holding. Their only remaining interest, therefore, was in
receiving prospective constitutional guidance concerning the validity
of future in-school interviews that might be directed at future students.
More specifically, they wanted the Supreme Court to free them from
the prospective guidance that the Ninth Circuit had given them in
holding that the Fourth Amendment prohibited in-school searches
without adequate Fourth Amendment safeguards. But recognition of
that interest poses a serious Article III problem.
Assume that it were Congress rather than the Ninth Circuit that
prohibited the future in-school interviews that Camreta and Alford
wished to conduct. If Congress had passed a statute, pursuant to its
Section 5 power under the Fourteenth Amendment, that was designed
to implement the Fourth Amendment by preventing in-school
interviews without adequate Fourth Amendment safeguards, Article III
would not give a federal court jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of
Congress's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment based solely on
congressional enactment of the statute. 38 Rather, a preenforcement
challenge to the statute could be maintained only by filing an
injunctive or declaratory judgment action against some particular
student or class of students whom the officials planned imminently to
interview in violation of the terms of the statute. Indeed, those
stringent particularity and imminence requirements are imposed by the
very Lyons decision that Justice Kagan cites in the quoted excerpt
from her opinion.
The desire of the officials to be free from the Ninth Circuit's
Fourth Amendment ruling in the actual Camreta case seems vulnerable
to precisely the same Article III problem. Just as Article III prohibited
the officials from challenging a congressional interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment in the absence of a live controversy that existed
between the officials and some particular student whom the officials
wished imminently to interview, Article III also prohibits the officials
from challenging a Ninth Circuit interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment in the absence of a live controversy that exists between
the officials and some particular student whom the officials wish
imminently to interview. But here there is no such student. The only
particular student involved in the litigation is S.G., and the officials
38. See Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 360. The Supreme Court has limited the Section 5
remedial power of Congress to harms that the judiciary determines are produced by the
violation of rights specified in or incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. See City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516-29 (1997); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598,619-28 (2000).
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have expressed no desire to interview her again. Even if the officials
were to announce a desire to interview S.G. or some other particular
student in the future, that would not eliminate the Article III problem.
Such an announcement might enable the officials to commence their
own injunctive or declaratory judgment action against the identified
student, in a way that presented an Article III case or controversy,
provided that the Lyons imminence and particularity requirements
were satisfied. However, it would have no bearing on the Article III
validity of the Camreta appeal itself. The live dispute that had
previously existed between Sarah and the officials terminated with the
Ninth Circuit qualified immunity holding, and any future disputes that
might occur between the officials and other hypothetical students had
yet to arise. 39
It is true that federal courts do possess Article III jurisdiction to
issue declaratory judgments.40 However, no declaratory judgment
action was ever filed by the officials against the contemplated target of
any future in-school sexual abuse interview. Moreover, even if the
Camreta and Alford petitions for certiorari could be viewed as
analogous to a complaint commencing such a declaratory judgment
action, a federal court's declaratory judgment jurisdiction is still
41
subject to the Article III case or controversy requirement. And once
again, no ripe Article III case or controversy could exist in the absence
of a particularly identified party before the court whom the officials
sought imminently to interview.

b.

N onappealing Party

Even if the desire to obtain prospective constitutional guidance
could somehow be viewed as sufficient to give prevailing immunized
officials an Article III stake in obtaining an advisory opinion, Justice
Kagan emphasized that the other party-the nonprevailing party,
whose damage claim was rejected in the court below-would also
have to retain an Article III stake in the outcome. Sarah did, of course,
possess a cognizable interest in the damage claim that she asserted in
the Camreta litigation. However, that interest ceased to exist once
Sarah chose not to appeal the Ninth Circuit denial of her damage claim
to the Supreme Court. Indeed, the absence of an appeal by Sarah
39.
Justice Kennedy appears to make essentially the same point in his Camreta
dissent. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2042-43 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
40.
See Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 955 (1934) (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (2006)).
41.
See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 325 (1936).
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should have caused the Ninth Circuit denial of her damage claim to
become final, and binding on all parties as the law of the case. Article
III, therefore, permits Supreme Court review of the Ninth Circuit
decision only if Sarah possesses some other interest that survived the
unappealed denial of her damage claim.
In determining whether some other such interest exists, it is worth
noting that Sarah's decision not to appeal may well have been both
deliberate and strategic. After having lost in the Ninth Circuit, Sarah
may have chosen not to appeal precisely because she did not want to
incur the risk of creating an adverse Supreme Court precedent. If that
were the case, recognition of a continuing interest that Sarah possessed
in Supreme Court review-an interest that would be diametrically
opposed to Sarah's manifest interest in avoiding review-would permit
the prevailing officials to foist upon Sarah an appeal that she had
affirmatively chosen not to take.
Because Sarah sued only for damages, she could not have
possessed any cognizable interest in prospective relief that persisted
after her damage claim had been denied. Indeed, no such interest was
ever present in the Camreta litigation, because Sarah never sued for
declaratory or injunctive relief. As a result, it seems that there are only
two ways in which Sarah could possess an interest in Supreme Court
review of the unappealed Ninth Circuit denial of her damage claim. It
might be that some de facto desire to avoid future unconstitutional
interviews of S.G. could give Sarah an Article III interest in Supreme
Court review, even though Sarah had never asserted a claim for
prospective relief in the litigation. Alternatively, it might be that an
appeal by the prevailing immunized officials could somehow give
Sarah a continuing prospective interest in the outcome that she would
not have possessed in the absence of such an appeal. But neither
theory seems plausible.
It is unlikely that a de facto desire to avoid future unconstitutional
interviews could give Sarah an Article III interest in Supreme Court
review of the Ninth Circuit's Fourth Amendment ruling even though
Sarah had never requested declaratory or injunctive relief in the course
of the Camreta litigation. It is true that Article III now recognizes
jurisdiction based on an "injury in fact," rather than on the narrower
conception of a "legal right" that characterized earlier eras of
42
justiciability jurisprudence.
But the contemporary law of
42.
See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2028 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)); cfTenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 13738 (1939) (establishing older "legal right" test).
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justiciability is quite strenuous in its insistence that Article III demands
highly particularized allegations and proof of injury, causation, and
redressability. 43 Accordingly, the Lyons case that Justice Kagan cites in
the block quote reproduced above reversed an injunction affirmed by
the court of appeals that barred excessive police force in the form of
choke holds that were allegedly used in routine traffic stops and other
nonthreatening situations. 44 The Supreme Court reversed because
Article III did not permit the suit to be maintained by a plaintiff who
had been the victim of such a choke hold in the past and who feared
the repeated use of such choke holds in the future. Although Article III
permitted the plaintiff to sue for damages caused by his past choke
hold injuries, it did not permit him to sue for prospective declaratory or
injunctive relief, because he failed to establish a "real and immediate"
threat of recurrence that was not "conjectural" or "hypothetical.'>45 Any
prospective interest that Sarah had in avoiding a repeated
unconstitutional interview of her daughter S.G. would certainly fall
victim to the same fate. The fact that Sarah-unlike the plaintiff in
Lyons-had never requested prospective relief means that there was
never an occasion for her to allege or prove the threat of prospective
injury that Lyons holds is required by Article III. As a result, even if an
unarticulated prospective interest in avoiding unconstitutional
interviews could constitute an "injury in fact," it would still be far less
"real and immediate"-and far more "conjectural" and "hypotheticcal"-than the prospective interest found wanting for Article III
purposes in Lyons.
It is equally implausible that Sarah simply acquired a stake in
Supreme Court review of the Ninth Circuit decision once the
immunized officials were granted review. Normally, a respondent has
a continuing stake in the outcome of an appeal because the respondent
is defending a victory below. Here, however, the respondent had no
victory to defend, so it is unclear how she could have any continuing
stake in the outcome. As a formal matter, it cannot be that simply
granting review to one party automatically gives the other party an
Article III stake in the outcome of an appeal.
That would
tautologically collapse Justice Kagan's insistence that each party have a
continuing stake in the outcome into a requirement that only one party
have a continuing stake.46 As a substantive matter, the claim that one
43.
44.
45.
46.

See Lllj"an, 504 U.S. at 559-62.
See supra text accompanying note 36.
See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-13 (1983).
See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2028.
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party's appeal automatically vests the other party with a stake in the
outcome fares no better. There is an instrumental reason for the
Article III requirement that both sides retain a personal stake in the
outcome throughout the course of the litigation. As Justice Kagan
stated, "[T]he opposing party also must have an ongoing interest in the
dispute, so that the case features 'that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues."><~ "That concrete adverseness"
seems unlikely to be present when a party both lacks any prospective
stake in the outcome, and chooses not to appeal an adverse ruling
below.
In this regard, it is interesting to note that the transcript of the oral
argument in Camreta includes an amusing colloquy between Chief
Justice Roberts and Sarah's lawyer that seems to illustrate the
"concrete adverseness" point. Wondering about Sarah's continuing
interest in the litigation, Chief Justice Roberts asks, "[W]hy are you
here?... You're not challenging the qualified immunity ruling? ...
[W]hy didn't you just go away?" After the ensuing laughter died
down, Sarah's lawyer responded, "S.G. does not have a legally
cognizable stake, Your Honor. She won a moral victory when she
obtained a ruling in her favor on the Fourth Amendment claim in the
Ninth Circuit, but as this Court said in Hewitt v. Helms, a moral
victory is no victory at all ... :><~s
In light of this colloquy, it is also interesting to wonder what the
Supreme Court would have done in Camreta if Sarah had elected not
to participate in Supreme Court review of the Ninth Circuit decision,
precisely because she did not view herself as retaining any prospective
stake in the outcome of the case once her damage claim had been
denied. In such an event, the Article III problem would have been
presented in a way that was even more stark. However, past decisions
reveal the Supreme Court might still have permitted review. The Court
sometimes reviews a case on an issue, despite what would normally be
viewed as a stark absence of Article III adverseness, by appointing an
amicus curiae to support the challenged judgment below. The modem
Court has done this twice every three Terms,49 and the current Court
7

4 7.
See id. (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at I 01 ).
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 27-28, Ca.mreta, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (Nos. 0948.
1454, 09-1478).
49.
See Brian P Goldman, Note, Should the Supreme Court Stop Inviting Amici
Cunae To Deknd Abandoned Lower Court Decisions?, 63 STAN. L. REv. 907, 909-10 (20 II).
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did it in another case decided during the Camreta Term. 50 More
famously, the Court also did this in the 2012 Health Care litigation,
appointing amici to argue severability and Anti-Injunction Act
positions that none of the parties supported. 51 In such cases the
Supreme Court chooses to review the decision below, but it is able to
do so only at the cost of imposing a serious strain on the concept of
Article III jurisdiction. Likewise in Camreta, the Supreme Court
authorized review of the decision below, but once again, it did so only
at the cost of imposing a serious strain on Article III.
c.

Camreta Paradox

Even if one assumes that the Supreme Court properly found the
existence of Article III jurisdiction to review constitutional claims
asserted by prevailing parties against opposing parties, in retrospective
damage actions that the opposing parties chose not to appeal, the
Supreme Court's decision in Camreta would still be paradoxical.
Despite taking such pains to hold that it had Article III jurisdiction
when both parties possessed a prospective stake in the outcome, the
Supreme Court ultimately held that it lacked Article III jurisdiction to
review the lower court's Fourth Amendment ruling in Camreta itself.
Although Camreta retained a stake in the outcome, Sarah's claim had
become moot. At the time of Supreme Court review, S.G. had moved
from Oregon to Florida, was a few months away from her eighteenth
birthday, and would soon graduate from high school. As a result, the
Court concluded there was no realistic likelihood that S.G. would
again be subject to an interview as a minor by Oregon public officials
during a child sexual abuse investigation. 52
If that mootness determination was correct, the Supreme Court
properly held that it lacked Article III jurisdiction to review the Ninth
Circuit's Fourth Amendment decision. But if the case was moot, the
Supreme Court also lacked Article III jurisdiction to issue that portion
50. See Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355,2361,2363-67 (2011) (appointing
amicus to permit adjudication of private party's standing to raise Tenth Amendment claims of
interference with state sovereignty, even though both parties conceded standing on appeal).
51. See Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F. 3d 1235 (11th Cir.
2011), cert.granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011); Dep'tofHealth&HumanServs., 132 S. Ct. 609
(2011) (mem.) (appointing amicus curiae); Dep'tofHealth & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 609
(2011) (mem.) (same).
52. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2033-34. Unlike Camreta, Deputy Sheriff Alford
ceased to possess a stake in the outcome. Because he was no longer serving as a law
enforcement officer, he would not be involved in future child sexual abuse investigations.
See id at 2034 n.9.
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of the opm10n holding that it possessed jurisdiction to review
constitutional claims by prevailing parties in more typical qualified
immunity cases. The bulk of the Court's Camreta opinion was,
therefore, a classic advisory opinion. It was issued despite the fact that
it did nothing to resolve a live case or controversy. Paradoxically, the
Camreta Court had issued an advisory opinion in the process of
holding that it lacked jurisdiction to issue the very advisory opinion
that it had just issued. 53
Normally, when a case becomes moot on appeal, the Supreme
Court dismisses the appeal and vacates the judgment below in
accordance with the procedure specified in Umted States v.
Munsingwear, Inc. 54 Justice Kagan followed that procedure in
dismissing the Ninth Circuit holding that the in-school interview of
S.G. violated the Fourth Amendment. In freeing the officials from the
prospective effect of the Ninth Circuit holding, Justice Kagan stated,
"The equitable remedy of vacatur ensures that 'those who have been
prevented from obtaining the review to which they are entitled [are]
not ... treated as if there had been a review."'55 This prevented the
Ninth Circuit interpretation of the Fourth Amendment from becoming
final without the opportunity for Supreme Court review. But given
that the Munsingwear mootness dismissal eliminated any prospective
effect of the Ninth Circuit's Fourth Amendment ruling, the interesting
question is why Justice Kagan saw the additional need to issue her
advisory opinion holding that Article III permitted prevailing parties to
obtain review of constitutional issues in qualified immunity cases. It
appears that Justice Kagan was trying to solve a practical problem.
As noted above, constitutional claims in qualified immunity
cases might never be adjudicated if lower courts were not permitted to
issue advisory opinions addressing those claims despite the existence
53. Arguably, the holding in Camreta was merely anomalous, rather than truly
paradoxical. The Supreme Court could have waited for a case that was not moot in which to
announce its new prevailing-party review rule. However, no prevailing party was likely to
seek review in a subsequent qualified immunity case. Prior to Camreta, such review would
have been viewed as barred by the advisory opinion prohibition. It was only by authorizing
prevailing-party review in the course of its Camreta mootness dismissal that the Court could
realistically effectuate such review in future cases. The Court apparently did not want to
waste the potentially unique opportunity presented by the unorthodox Camreta petition for
review-a petition filed by a prevailing party in a case where the losing party had chosen not
to appeal. In any event, the Fourth Amendment exposition that the Court has authorized in
qualified immunity cases is truly paradoxical.
54. 340 u.s. 36, 39-40 (1950).
55. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2035 (alteration in original) (quoting Munsingwear,
340 U.S. at 39).
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of dispositive immunity defenses. Justice Kagan was acutely aware
of this problem. 57 In cases like Camreta, where the losing party elected
not to seek Supreme Court review, the lower court's potentially
erroneous constitutional ruling would remain in effect without any
opportunity for Supreme Court review. There would be no occasion
for a Munsingwear dismissal on mootness grounds, because there
would be no appeal to serve as the vehicle for a Munsingwear
dismissal.
Perhaps review could simply be exercised in the next case that
presented the asserted constitutional claim. But the next case might
not readily arise. Once the lower court ruled that the actions of the
government official were unconstitutional, government officials would
be unlikely to engage in the conduct at issue-even though the lower
court decision might be an erroneous decision that was never reviewed
by the Supreme Court. Officials would be directly precluded from
doing so in the circuit that had issued the lower court decision, because
the lower court decision would be the law of that circuit. Moreover,
government officials in other circuits would likely also cease the
practice, because they could no longer confidently rely on qualified
immunity to protect them from damage claims. The lower court
decision might render the supposed unconstitutionality of the practice
"clearly established," thereby depriving officials of qualified immunity
if they continued to engage in the practice. Accordingly, Justice Kagan
issued her advisory opinion in order to solve this problem. Her
advisory opinion held that prevailing parties would have the Article III
ability to seek Supreme Court review in such situations, as a way of
permitting review that might otherwise be unavailable. 58
In balancing the practical need to provide a route for Supreme
Court review against the constitutional need to remain within the
confines of Article III jurisdiction, Justice Kagan favored the practical
need. At least four other Justices, however, disagreed with her
resolution of that conflict. Justice Sotomayor concurred in the
judgment, in an opinion joined by Justice Breyer. She asserted that the
Camreta case should simply be dismissed as moot, and the Fourth
Amendment portion of the Ninth Circuit opinion that the prevailing
officials sought to challenge should be vacated under Munsingwear. 59
Justice Kennedy dissented in an opinion joined by Justice Thomas.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2030-32.
Seeid at2031-32.
See 1d at 2036-37 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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Even after recognizing the practical problem that Justice Kagan was
trying to solve, Justice Kennedy nevertheless concluded that Justice
Kagan's opinion authorizing review by prevailing parties was an
advisory opinion that exceeded the scope of the Court's constitutional
60
jurisdiction under Article Ill.
He also disputed Justice Kagan's
suggestion that the Supreme Court had ever in the past granted review
to prevailing parties. 61 Justice Kennedy viewed the advisory opinion
problem as being so serious that "the Court might find it necessary to
reconsider its special permission that the Courts of Appeals may issue
unnecessary merits determinations in qualified immunity cases with
62
binding precedential effect." Although Justice Scalia concurred in
Justice Kagan's opinion as one that "reasonably applies our precedents,
strange though they may be," Justice Scalia was willing in an
appropriate case to consider Justice Kennedy's suggestion that the
Court "end the extraordinary practice of ruling upon constitutional
questions unnecessarily when the defendant possesses qualified
immunity."63 Accordingly, at least four-and possibly five-of the
Justices on the Camreta Court appear to view Justice Kagan's opinion
as an unconstitutional advisory opinion.
Although constitutional limitations on the scope of federal court
jurisdiction under Article III would seem to be fundamental, the
various Camreta opinions reveal that reasonable minds can differ about
the degree to which those limitations should give way to practical
considerations concerning the need to provide prospective
constitutional guidance to government officials. The availability of
alternate routes for obtaining Supreme Court guidance would seem to
be relevant to this issue, and Justice Kennedy argued, "Other dynamics
permit the law of the Constitution to be elaborated within the
conventional framework of a case or controversy.'>64 He suggested that,
aside from qualified immunity cases, Supreme Court constitutional
guidance could be provided in cases or controversies that arose out of
Fourth and Fifth Amendment suppression challenges, defenses against
criminal prosecutions, civil suits, cruel and unusual punishment
claims, constitutional suits against municipalities (where qualified
immunity is not available), suits against officials whose conduct was
60.
See id at 2037, 2040-43 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See id at 2038-40. Justice Kagan responded that she was merely asserting that
61.
the Supreme Court had never stated that Article III was a bar to review by prevailing parties.
See id at 2029 n.3 (majority opinion).
62. Id at 2043 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
63. Id at 2036 (Scalia, J., concurring).
64. Id at 2043 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

2012]

ADVISORY ADJUDICATION

1311

too extreme to warrant qualified immunity, and ripe preenforcement
declaratory or injunctive actions that did not include claims for
damages. 65
If Justice Kennedy's suggested alternative routes for obtaining
Supreme Court review seem adequate, there was no pressing need for
Justice Kagan to issue her prevailing-party advisory opinion. But even
if Justice Kennedy's alternatives seem inadequate, it is important to
remember that the absence of an opportunity for the Supreme Court to
clarify the meaning of a constitutional provision is not necessarily a
bad thing. The Supreme Court's own justiciability decisions have held
that the absence of an Article III route to federal court adjudication of a
constitutional issue may reflect the fact that the issue at stake is simply
not suitable for judicial resolution, and should instead be resolved by
the political branches of government consistent with our system of
separated governmental powers.66 If the need for constitutional
guidance can tolerate wholesale preclusion of review when necessary
to satisfy Article III, it should also be able to tolerate the mere delay
that would be occasioned by declining to authorize review at the
request of prevailing parties in qualified immunity cases.
There are also some seeming inconsistencies in Justice Kagan's
opinion that might cause one to question the need for her advisory
opinion authorizing review by prevailing parties. Justice Kennedy
points out that Justice Kagan's advisory opinion permits prevailing
immunized parties to seek Supreme Court review of adverse lower
court constitutional rulings, but it does not authorize courts of appeals

65.
See id at 2043-44. Since Camreta was decided, several commentators have
argued that considering the merits of constitutional claims in qualified immunity cases
remains necessary for the orderly development of Fourth Amendment law. See, e.g., Orin S.
Kerr, Fourth Amendment Remedies and Development ofthe Law: A Comment on Camreta v.
Greene and Davis v. United States, 2010-2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 237, 237-39, 245-48, 261
(2011); Michael T. Kirkpatrick & Joshua Matz, Avoiding Pennanent Ljmbo: Qualified
Immunity and the Elaboration of Constitutional Rights /Tom Saucier to Camreta (and
Beyond), 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 643, 643-45, 656-69, 679 (2011); Sarah L. Lochner,
Comment, Qualified lmmunJty, Constitutional Stagnation, and the Global War on Terror, 105
Nw. U. L. REv. 829, 830-32, 859-64, 868 (2011); cf. Ted Sampsell-Janes & Jenna Yauch,
Measuring Pearson in the Circuits, 80 FORDHAM L. REv. 623,623-25 (2011) (finding lower
courts continued to address Fourth Amendment claims in qualified immunity cases at the
same rate, even when the Supreme Court no longer required them to do so).
See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1442-43,
66.
1449 (20 11 ); Valley Forge Christian Coli. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 488-90 (1982); United States v. Richardson 418 U.S. 166, 179-80 (1974);
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1974); Ex parte
Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 633-34 (1937) (per curiam); see also Spann, supra note I 0, at 637-38
n.226.
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to entertain such appeals by officials who prevailed in a district court.
Justice Kagan justifies this differential treatment by noting that district
courts do not establish binding law for circuits in the way that courts of
appeals do. 68 However, if the point of Justice Kagan's Camreta opinion
is to provide prospective judicial guidance so that government officials
would not be chilled by potentially erroneous constitutional rulings
issued by lower courts, it is not clear why that rationale would not also
apply to the correction of potential district court errors by a court of
appeals. This is particularly true in light of the fact that the
overwhelming majority of court of appeals decisions end up being
final under the Supreme Court's certiorari practice. 69 Because the
whole point is to prevent an official from having to wonder whether a
constitutional rule has been "clearly established" for qualified
immunity purposes, the technical binding effect of a lower court ruling
would seem to be largely irrelevant.
Justice Kagan's opinion also seems internally inconsistent in how
it treats the concept of a continuing stake in the outcome. Justice
Kagan emphasizes that both parties must have a personal stake in the
outcome of a case in order to give the Supreme Court Article III
jurisdiction to review the case. 70 She then views Sarah's continuing
stake in the Camreta litigation as sufficient to permit the Supreme
Court to issue its prevailing-party advisory opinion, but not sufficient
71
to permit the Court to issue a Fourth Amendment advisory opinion.
Stated differently, if Sarah's stake in the outcome became moot enough
to prevent the Court from addressing the Fourth Amendment issue,
why was it not also moot enough to prevent the Court from addressing
the prevailing-party issue? These are, of course, simply different ways
of phrasing my basic point that Camreta's treatment of the advisory
opinion prohibition was paradoxical. 72 However, focusing on the
mootness aspect of the Court's decision is illuminating.
It turns out that, in addition to asserting her Fourth Amendment
claims against Carnreta and Alford, Sarah also asserted a Fourth
67. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2043 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
68.
See id at 2033 & n.7 (majority opinion). Justice Kagan's opinion expressly
leaves open the question of whether courts of appeals could entertain appeals brought by
prevailing immunized parties. Id at 2033.
69. In its 2009 Term, the Supreme Court granted review in 0.9% of the certiorari
petitions filed. See The Supreme Court, 2009 Term-The Statistics, 124 HARV. L. REv. 411,
418 (2010).
70.
See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2028.
71.
Compare id at 2029, with id at 2033-34.
72.
See supra Part II.A.3.c.
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Amendment municipal liability claim against the county that
employed Alford as a Deputy Sheriff. The district court, however,
granted summary judgment for the county, and Sarah did not appeal
that ruling. The municipal liability claim is relevant because Camreta
argued that the existence of that claim prevented the Fourth
Amendment issue from becoming moot. Carnreta argued that Sarah
had a continuing interest in resolution of the Fourth Amendment issue
because, if it were resolved in her favor, that would facilitate her ability
to establish municipal liability against the county. 73 Justice Kagan
rejected that argument, quoting Judge Posner's proposition: '"[O]ne
can never be certain that findings made in a decision concluding one
lawsuit will not some day ... control the outcome of another suit. But
if that were enough to avoid mootness, no case would ever be moot."' 74
However, the very thing that prompted Justice Kagan to authorize
prevailing-party appeals in her advisory opinion was the desire to "be
certain" that "findings made in a decision concluding one lawsuit"
would directly "control the outcome of another suit." She wanted
proper resolution of the constitutional claim presented in a qualified
immunity decision to control the outcome of future suits in which an
official's conduct would be subject to the same constitutional claim. If
Carnreta's interest in a ruling that would facilitate his defense to a
constitutional claim in a future suit is sufficient to satisfy Article III, it
is difficult to see why Sarah's interest in a ruling that would facilitate
her assertion of a constitutional claim in the same suit should not also
be sufficient to satisfy Article III. And if Sarah's interest had as much
prospective utility as the interest of Carnreta that Justice Kagan found
73.
See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2034. As Justice Kagan characterizes the procedural
history, it is not clear why the district court denial of Sarah's municipal liability claim was not
simply the law of the case. The court of appeals held that Sarah's failure to appeal the district
court rejection of her municipal liability claim constituted a waiver of that claim. See Greene
II, 588 F.3d 1011, 1020 n.4 (9th Cir. 2009). Justice Kagan's opinion states that Sarah's more
recent request to have the claim reinstated was also denied by the district court on January 4,
2011. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2034. That should have barred future efforts to assert the
claim as res judicata. However, during oral argument in the Supreme Court, counsel for
Camreta stated that Sarah's motion to reinstate the claim was being held in abeyance by the
district court pending Supreme Court resolution of the case. See Transcript of Oral Argument
at 7-8, Camreta, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (Nos. 09-1454, 09-1478). In addition, Sarah's brief in the
Supreme Court stated that her Rule 60 motion to reinstate the municipal liability claim had
been denied by the district court as premature, without prejudice to renewing that motion
after the Supreme Court ruled. See Brief for Respondents at 32 n.20, Camreta, 131 S. Ct.
2020 (Nos. 09-1454, 09-14 78). This would arguably avoid immediate res judicata problems
by leaving the claim potentially alive, and potentially available to avoid a Supreme Court
mootness determination.
74.
See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2034 (alteration in original) (quoting Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Bd. ofTrade of Chi., 701 F.2d 653,656 (7th Cir. 1983)).
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to be live, it is difficult to see why Sarah's interest should be viewed as
moot. 75
In the process of holding Sarah's municipal liability damage
claim moot, Justice Kagan notes that Sarah did not appeal the district
76
court denial of that claim. But Sarah did not appeal the court of
appeals denial of her damage claim against Camreta and Alford either.
If Sarah's failure to appeal the district court rejection of her municipal
liability claim was sufficiently final to make her claim against the
county moot, why was not her failure to appeal the court of appeals
rejection of her damage claim against Camreta and Alford sufficiently
final to make her claim against Carnreta and Alford moot as well?
It is true that Justice Kagan did vacate the appellate court's Fourth
Amendment holding as moot, but that simply exacerbates the finality
problem. After having dismissed the court of appeals Fourth
Amendment claim as moot, Justice Kagan did not dismiss the court of
appeals qualified immunity holding as moot--even though both
holdings would seem to be equally final in light of Sarah's decision not
to appeal. Moreover, Justice Sotomayor's concurrence in the judgment
appears to agree with this bifurcated application of the mootness
doctrine. 77 Nevertheless, there does not seem to be any doctrinal basis
for treating the finality of Sarah's failure to appeal differently with
respect to the two courts of appeals holdings.
One might be tempted to argue that the difference between the
two courts of appeals holdings is that the prevailing parties appealed
the Fourth Amendment holding, while no party appealed the qualified
immunity holding. However, that argument ultimately seems circular.
The very issue under consideration is whether Article III permits
review by prevailing parties in qualified immunity cases. As a result,
the suggestion that mootness is avoided because a prevailing party has
appealed simply begs the question. In distinguishing between the
Fourth Amendment and qualified immunity holdings for mootness
purposes, it seems that the Supreme Court was merely motivated by a
desire to authorize review by prevailing parties who seek prospective
constitutional guidance. Achieving that objective would have been
more awkward if the lower court qualified immunity holding were
dismissed as moot.
75. This problem reemerges in Umted States v. Juvem/e Male, 131 S. Ct. 2860 (2011)
(per curiam), which is discussed in/Ta Part II.B.
76. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2034.
77.
See id at 2036-37 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (favoring vacatur only of the
portion of the lower court opinion officials sought to challenge).
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As indicated above/8 one cannot help but notice that the interest
of immunized government officials in obtaining prospective
constitutional guidance that Justice Kagan finds sufficient for Article
III purposes in Camreta would probably not be sufficient to satisfy
Article III under Lyons if the officials were filing a declaratory or
injunctive action of their own in a federal district court. That raises the
possibility that Article III justiciability concerns apply with less force
in the Supreme Court than they do in lower federal courts. To the best
of my knowledge, the Supreme Court has never held this directly.
However, the Supreme Court does sometimes behave as if this were
true. In addition to issuing its advisory opinion in Camreta, the Court
has held that it has Article III jurisdiction to review constitutional
decisions of state courts even when the state court litigation did not
present an Article III case or controversy. 79 Moreover, Justice Kagan's
willingness to permit prevailing-party review in the Supreme Court,
even though it might not be permitted in courts of appeals, suggests
that Article III might apply with greater force in the lower federal
courts than it does in the Supreme Court. 80 Although the idea that
Article III might be sufficiently flexible to impose different demands
on different federal courts is an intriguing one, it can claim little
support from the text of Article 111.81 And to the extent that Article III
is properly understood as serving separation of powers functions,
separation of powers dangers are more likely to be present when the
Supreme Court is adopting prospective constitutional rules than when
lower courts are resolving disputes between the parties.
It is difficult to square Justice Kagan's Camreta opinion with the
traditional Article III prohibition on advisory opinions. The portion of
the opinion that authorized prevailing parties in qualified immunity
cases to seek Supreme Court review of lower court constitutional
rulings seems to have violated Article III in two different respects. It
constituted the issuance of an advisory opinion that was not necessary
78. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
79. See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617-24 ( 1989); see also FALLON ET
AL., supra note 12, at 1216-23.
80.
See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2033. Justice Kagan does not address whether the
different status presented by court of appeals review is rooted in Article III or prudential
considerations. See id
81.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The text of Article III does distinguish between
"Cases" and "Controversies" in a way that could support a view that the various justiciability
doctrines associated with Article III apply to "Controversies" but not to "Cases." See Spann,
supra note 10, at 607 n.83. However, to the best of my knowledge, the Supreme Court has
never distinguished between "Cases" and "Controversies" in articulating the scope of federal
court jurisdiction.
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to resolution of the dispute between the parties. And it constituted the
issuance of an advisory opinion in a case that the Court held was moot.
The Court appears to have permitted practical considerations related to
the desire for prospective judicial guidance to override constitutional
considerations related to the limitations on federal jurisdiction.
Moreover, it did so in a case where the Court's sole motive seems to
have been to facilitate the very provision of abstract constitutional
exposition that the advisory opinion prohibition was designed to
prevent. As it turns out, Camreta is not the only case in which the
Supreme Court has made that trade-off.

B.

SeeAlso

In one sense, the Camreta decision is unusual. Although it is
doctrinally complex, its internal contradictions reside fairly close to the
surface of the opinion. However, in another sense, the case is quite
pedestrian. In fact, one need look no further than the last month of the
same 2010 Term in which Camreta was decided to find that the Court
often issues decisions that pose similar advisory opinion problems.
In Ashcroft v. aJ-J(jdd, issued just five days after Camreta, the
Court issued another advisory opinion under similar doctrinal
circumstances. 82
Al-Kidd sued Attorney General Ashcroft for
damages, alleging that he was harshly detained for an extended period
of time under a material witness warrant. He argued that he was
arrested pursuant to the Attorney General's post-September 11, 2001,
policy of making pretextual use of the federal material witness statute
for the preventive detention of suspected terrorists whom the
government had no intention of calling as witnesses but lacked
evidence to arrest. Al-Kidd's allegation that this pretextual policy
violated his Fourth Amendment rights survived a motion to dismiss in
the district court. The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of al-Kidd on both
Fourth Amendment and immunity grounds, rejecting Ashcroft's
83
qualified and absolute immunity claims.
The Supreme Court
reversed, finding no Fourth Amendment violation, and finding that
84
Ashcroft was entitled to qualified irnmunity.
Al-Kldd is reminiscent of Camreta, but without the mootness or
prevailing-party appeal complications. In al-Kldd, Justice Scalia's
majority opinion resolved both the qualified immunity claim and the
82.
83.
84.

131 s. Ct. 2074 (2011).
See id at 2079-80.
See id at 2083, 2085.
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merits of the Fourth Amendment claim. One or the other of those
holdings constituted an advisory opinion, because either standing
alone was sufficient to resolve the dispute between the parties.
Accordingly, three Justices argued that the Court should not have
reached the merits of the Fourth Amendment claim. 85 Interestingly,
Justices Kennedy and Thomas did not adopt this position. They
instead joined Justice Scalia's majority opinion,86 even though they had
argued that the Camreta prevailing-party holding was an advisory
opinion. 87 Justice Kagan took no part in the decision, but to be
consistent with her Camreta opinion, it seems that she would have had
to join Justice Scalia's majority opinion in al-Kidd, rather than
agreeing with the three other Justices typically identified as liberals in
rejecting the propriety of issuing an advisory opinion resolving the
merits of the Fourth Amendment claim. 88 It is also interesting to note
that Justice Scalia's al-Kidd majority opinion declined to address the
rejection of Ashcroft's absolute immunity defense by the Ninth Circuit.
Ironically, Justice Scalia emphasized that resolution of the absolute
immunity issue was not necessary to the decision. 89
In Umted States v. Juvemle Male, a per curiam Supreme Court
decision dismissed as moot an ex post facto challenge to a federal
statute requiring sex offenders to register in any jurisdiction where the
offender resides, is employed, or attends school. 90 A juvenile convicted
of sex offenses that occurred prior to enactment of the statute
challenged a district court supervision order that included a
registration requirement. The district court order was apparently based
on an interim rule issued by the Attorney General, providing that the
federal registration statute applied retroactively. The Ninth Circuit
vacated the district court registration requirement, holding that
retroactive application of the federal statute violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the Constitution. However, the district court supervision
order had expired when the juvenile turned twenty-one-prior to the
Ninth Circuit decision-and the Supreme Court found an absence of
85.
See id at 2087 (Ginsburg, J., concurring, joined by Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ.); id
at 2089-90 (Sotomayor, J., concurring, joined by Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.).
86.
See id at 2085 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
· 87.
See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2037, 2040-43 (2011) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting, joined by Thomas, J.).
88. Note, however, that Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Kagan's advisory opinion in
Camreta, see id at 2025-26, but objected to the Fourth Amendment advisory opinion in alKidd See al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2087 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
See al-Kldd, 131 S. Ct. at 2085.
89.
90.
131 S. Ct. 2860 (2011) (per curiam).
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any continuing collateral consequences resulting from the order. As a
result, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's ex post facto
holding as moot, finding the lack of Article III jurisdiction.9 '
The Supreme Court purported to be preventing the issuance of an
advisory opinion in Juvenile Male, but the Court's mootness
determination seems curious in light of Camreta. The Juvemle Male
Court found no continuing collateral consequences of the juvenile's
registration order, but the actual continuing effects seem quite
significant. Although the district court order expired when the juvenile
became twenty-one, he was still required to register under both federal
and Montana laws-unless, of course, retroactive application of those
laws violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. This not only gave the juvenile
a continuing stake in the outcome of his ex post facto claim, but the
district court registration order seems specifically to have been based
on acceptance of the Attorney General's interim rule providing for
retroactive application of the federal statute. 92 It is not surprising,
therefore, that the Ninth Circuit's ex post facto holding was expressly
addressed to the demands of the federal statute on which the district
court relied in issuing its registration order.93 The desire to defend that
holding on appeal would certainly seem like a sufficient stake in the
outcome to prevent a mootness dismissal. The Supreme Court
recognized this but stated that any ex post facto challenge to the
federal statute had to be brought in a separate preenforcement
challenge. 94 Although the validity of the statute and the Attorney
General's retroactive application rule seem fairly encompassed within
the juvenile's ex post facto challenge to the district court order that
interpreted them, the Supreme Court's mootness dismissal seems
inconsistent with Camreta even if the Court is correct in requiring a
separate preenforcement challenge. The Juvenile Male Court cites
Camreta, and its quotation of Judge Posner's language, for the
proposition that mootness in a particular case cannot be avoided by a
95
desire for some prospective benefit in a future case.
But as
96
emphasized above, the desire to permit an advisory opinion issued in
one case to govern the resolution of a constitutional issue in a
subsequent case is precisely what prompted the Court to issue its
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See id at 2862-65.
See 1d at 2862.
See United States v. Juvenile Male, 581 F.3d 977, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2009).
See Juvenile Male, 131 S. Ct. at 2864-65.
See 1d at 2864.
See supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
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prevailing-party advisory opinion in Camreta in the first place. And
the Camreta Court declined to require the very same preenforcement
challenge that the Juvenile Male Court insisted on. Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer and Sotomayor would have remanded the case so that the Ninth
Circuit could consider whether the case was moot, and Justice Kagan
did not participate. 98
In Turner v. Rogers, the Supreme Court issued another advisory
opinion in a mootness case. 99 There, the Supreme Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause did not automatically
provide a right to counsel in civil contempt hearings that could result in
incarceration for failure to make child support payments. 100 The case
should have been moot by traditional standards, because the petitioner
seeking counsel had already completed his twelve-month prison
sentence, and there were no collateral consequences of his contempt
citation to keep the case alive. However, the Court held that Article III
permitted resolution of the right to counsel claim under an established
mootness exception for cases that are "capable of repetition, yet
evading review." 101 Even though a twelve-month prison sentence might
be long enough to permit some lower court determinations of a right to
counsel claim, it is not long enough to permit full litigation through the
Supreme Court. 102 Reminiscent of Camreta, therefore, the very
existence of this mootness exception is to permit an opportunity for
Supreme Court resolution of legal issues, even when resolution is not
necessary to settle the dispute between the parties.
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme Court issued
alternative holdings in concluding that a large, nationwide class action
alleging employment discrimination against women could not be
maintained as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23. 103 The Court held five-to-four that the commonality requirement of

97. Although the Supreme Court chose not to address the ex post facto issue in
Juvenile Male, it subsequently held in another case that the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act did not require pre-Act offenders to register until the Attorney General
validly specified that it did. The Court then remanded the case for a determination of
whether the Attorney General's interim regulations constituted such a valid specification. See
Reynolds v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 97 5 (20 12); see also Juvenile Male, 131 S. Ct. at 2862
n.I.
98.
SeeJuvenileMale, 131 S.Ct.at2865.
99.
131 s. Ct. 2507 (2011).
100. See id. at 2512-13.
I 0 I. See id. at 2514-15 (internal quotation marks omitted).
I 02. See id.; see also 1d at 2521 n.l (Thomas J., dissenting).
103. 131 S.Ct.2541 (2011).
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Rule 23(a) had not been satisfied, 104 and it held nine-to-zero that the
back pay sought by the plaintiffs was not available in the Rule 23(b)(2)
class action that the plaintiffs were seeking to maintain. 105 Because
either one of those holdings would have been sufficient to resolve the
dispute between the parties, the other holding was, once again, an
106
advisory opinion. As was discussed above, it may be justifiable for a
lower court to issue alternative holdings in order to reduce the
likelihood of reversal on appeal. However, the Supreme Court is not
subject to reversal on appeal. As a result, alternative holdings at the
Supreme Court level seem like classic advisory opinions, intended
only to provide prospective legal guidance. Justice Ginsburg's dissent
does point out that the plaintiff in the district court requested
certification under Rule 23(b)(3) as an alternative to Rule 23(b)(2)
certification. 107 The Supreme Court's Rule 23(a) commonality
advisory opinion might, therefore, seem efficient if it is viewed as
providing dispositive guidance for any subsequent proceedings that
might have occurred in the district court. However, that advisory
opinion would still have been unnecessary if, as seems likely, the
plaintiffs would have chosen not to pursue Rule 23(b)(3) certification
in the district court. Perhaps that is why Justice Ginsburg went on to
argue that the propriety of any Rule 23(b)(3) class action should have
been resolved by the district court before being considered by the
Supreme Court. 108
In Bond v. United States, a unanimous Supreme Court issued an
advisory opinion in a case where there was no continuing dispute
between the parties-something that would normally preclude the
109
existence of an Article III case or controversy. The case involved the
conviction of a defendant who challenged the constitutionality of the
federal criminal statute under which she was convicted. The statute
prohibited the nonbenign use of toxic chemicals, and it was adopted in
order to implement a chemical weapons treaty to which the United
States was a party. However, the defendant argued that the statute
exceeded the scope of congressional power under the Tenth
104. See id at 2556-57; id at 2561-62 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part, joined by Breyer, Sotomayor, & Kagan, JJ.).
105. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557 (majority opinion); 1d at 2561-62,2567 (Ginsburg,
J, concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
I 07. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2561 n.l (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
108. See 1d at 2561.
109. 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011).
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Amendment. The Third Circuit rejected the challenge, finding that
individuals lack standing to complain about alleged Tenth Amendment
federalism violations, because such violations harm states rather than
individuals. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the defendant
did have standing to assert the Tenth Amendment claim, and remanded
for consideration of the merits of that claim.'' 0
The Supreme Court holding was an advisory opinion because a
lack of adverseness meant that there was no continuing dispute
between the parties when the Supreme Court resolved the standing
issue. The United States had initially contested the defendant's
standing, but it had conceded standing by the time of Supreme Court
review.''' This lack of adverseness would seem to have deprived the
Court of Article III jurisdiction to determine whether individuals have
standing to raise Tenth Amendment claims. The Court dealt with this
problem pragmatically, by appointing an amicus curiae to argue in
support of the Third Circuit decision under review.'' 2 But because a
nonparty by definition has no judicially cognizable stake in the
outcome of the particular dispute before the Court, the appointment of
an amicus served to highlight rather than remedy the advisory opinion
problem. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that it does
possess jurisdiction to resolve confession-of-error and voluntarycessation cases. '' 3 Moreover, the Court frequently appoints amici to
"solve" advisory opinion problems in cases where there is no
continuing dispute between the parties. One study has found that the
Court does this twice every three Terms." 4 Rather than dismiss and
vacate the lower court judgments in such cases, as is done after a
mootness determination under the Munsingwear doctrine," 5 the
Supreme Court presumably appoints amici precisely so that it can
provide prospective judicial guidance to nonparties. In Bond, the
Court provided immediate prospective guidance concerning who had
standing to raise Tenth Amendment claims, rather than waiting for a
case in which the issue was contested. If it turns out that the issue will
110. See id at 2360-61.
Ill. See id at 2361.
112. See 1d The Supreme Court held that there was no Article III problem because the
defendant's desire to overturn her conviction gave her a continuing stake in the outcome.
However, the Court did not discuss the Article III problem posed by lack of adverseness. See
1d at 2361-62.
113. See, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 58-62 (1968) (recognizing jurisdiction
to resolve issue after confession of error); United States v. WT. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 63233 (1953) (recognizing voluntary cessation exception to mootness doctrine).
114. See Goldman, supra note 49, at 909-10.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
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never be contested, once again, the Supreme Court has held that
Article III commits the issue to the political branches rather than the
judiciary for resolution. 116
In Davis v. United States, the Supreme Court compounded the
Camreta advisory opinion problem by apparently requiring the
issuance of advisory opinions in order to permit the future
development of Fourth Amendment law. 117 Justice Alito's majority
opinion in Davis expanded the good faith exception to the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule that the Court first recognized for
118
police officers acting on invalid warrants in United States v. Leon.
Davis held that evidence seized in violation of current Fourth
Amendment law should not be suppressed in criminal trials if, at the
119
time of the violation, then-binding precedent permitted the seizure.
Conceding that the new Fourth Amendment rule applied to the
defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm under the Court's
retroactivity precedents, Justice Alito concluded that the Fourth
Amendment still did not require suppression. 120 After balancing the
respective costs and benefits, he concluded that suppression was not
compelled where the police officer who seized the firearm was acting
in good faith, objectively reasonable compliance with then-binding
Eleventh Circuit precedent. As a result, suppression of the evidence
would serve no prospective deterrent function. 121
Justice Breyer's dissent pointed out that the Court's new good
faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule was likely
to ossify the future development of Fourth Amendment law, because
defendants no longer had an incentive to raise novel Fourth
Amendment claims once winning those claims ceased to result in the
suppression of unconstitutionally seized evidence. 122 Similar concerns
prompted Justice Sotomayor to argue that the new good faith
123
exception should not apply in cases where existing law is unsettled.
116. See supra text accompanying note 66. It is worth noting that the United States
conceded the existence of standing for the defendant to challenge the scope of congressional
authority but did not concede the existence of standing to challenge federal interference with
state sovereignty. Although the Supreme Court rejected this distinction, it does suggest that
Tenth Amendment cases could arise in which the United States did not concede standing.
See Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2365-67.
II 7. 131 S. Ct. 2419 (20 II).
118. 468 u.s. 897,913-25 (1984).
119. 131 S.Ct.at2423-24.
120. See 1d at 2425-26,2429-32.
121. See id at 2426-29.
122. See id at 2436-39 (Breyer, J. dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.).
123. See id at 2433-36 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Justice Alita responded that there were still ways in which novel Fourth
Amendment claims could make their way to the Supreme Court
notwithstanding the new good faith exception. 124 However, he did not
suggest ways that seem more realistic than the alternate ways that
Justice Kennedy's dissent proposed for presenting novel Fourth
Amendment claims in Camreta. And the Camreta Court viewed those
alternatives as insufficient to prevent ossification of the Fourth
Amendment-thereby justifying advisory resolution of Fourth
Amendment claims in the qualified immunity, prevailing-party appeals
that Camreta authorized. 125
There is a serious advisory opinion problem with the Davis
decision. The defendant's Supreme Court brief in Davis succinctly
crystalized the issue, arguing that prospective-only application of new
Fourth Amendment law would amount to '"a regime of rule-creation
by advisory opinion."' 126 Moreover, the brief noted that criminal
defendants might even lack Article III standing to assert novel Fourth
Amendment claims if the good faith exception meant that prevailing
on those claims would not redress the injuries that they sought to
prevent through suppression of the unconstitutionally seized evidence
that was presented to convict them. 127 The Davis decision may not
itself be an advisory opinion, but it seems to create a situation in which
future Fourth Amendment law can evolve on.ljrthrough the issuance of
advisory opinions. The new good faith exception means that novel
Fourth Amendment claims cannot have an effect on the outcome of the
dispute between the parties. Qualified immunity precludes the
development of Fourth Amendment law in damage actions--other
than through the issuance of the advisory opinions authorized in
Camreta. 128 And Lyons seems to preclude the development of Fourth
Amendment law through prospective injunction or declaratory
judgment actions. 129 Therefore, the only way that Fourth Amendment
law can develop is at the hands of judges who are willing to include
their musings about the Fourth Amendment in advisory opinions.
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Leon expressly appears to have

124. See id at 2433 (majority opinion).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65. The post-DaVIs ossification fear is
stressed in Kerr, supra note 65, at 237-39, 248-61.
126. See DaVIs, 131 S. Ct. at 2432 n.7 (quoting Brieffor Petitioner at 25, Davis, 131 S.
Ct. 2419 (No. 09-11328)).
127. Seeidat2434n.IO.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45.
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contemplated the issuance of such opinions. 130 But it is, of course,
precisely those advisory opinions that Article III says federal courts
lack the jurisdiction to issue.
The advisory opinion problem that permeates Camreta and other
Supreme Court decisions is both pervasive and persistent. But despite
the foundational nature of the Article III prohibition on advisory
opinions, no one seems to be particularly troubled by the frequency of
Supreme Court deviations from this constitutional limitation on federal
court jurisdiction. The interesting question is why that should be so.

Ill. JUDICIAL REVIEW
The classical model of judicial review is commonly traced to
Chief Justice John Marshall's decision in Marbury v. Madison, which
authorized the Supreme Court to invalidate acts of the coordinate
branches of government only when necessary to resolve particular
disputes between the parties. 131 However, the Court's use of advisory
opinions to provide prospective constitutional guidance, in cases like
Camreta and the other decisions described in Part II.B, is difficult to
square with the Marbury model of adjudication. The Court's advisory
opinion practice is, instead, more consistent with a model of
adjudication that views the Court as a policy-making branch m a
tricamerallegislative process.
A.

Marbury AcfjudicatkJn

The Constitution does not explicitly authorize the Supreme Court
to invalidate the acts of coordinate branches of the federal or state
governments. Rather, John Marshall recognized the power of judicial
review in Marbury only as a necessary incident to the judicial function
of resolving disputes between the parties in a way that complied with
the dictates of the Constitution. 132 In addition, Chief Justice John Jay's
1793 COJTespondence of the Justices adopted a prohibition on
advisory opinions, while declining to answer certain abstract questions
about the law of nations propounded by President George
Washington's administration. 133 Juxtaposing those two Supreme Court
130. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924-25 (1984) (authorizing lower court
advisory opinions to permit the continued development of Fourth Amendment law despite
recognition of a good faith exception to warrant requirement).
131. SeeS U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
132. See 1d at 176-80; see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 72-73; Spann, supra
note 10, at 589-90; Note, supra note 12, at 2064, 2068-69.
133. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 50-54; Note, supra note 12, at 2066-67.
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proclamations, the prohibition on advisory opinions is now understood
134
to reflect the Marbury dispute-resolution model of adjudication.
The advisory opinion prohibition is rooted in separation of
powers concerns. By limiting the constitutional exposition engaged in
by federal courts to the resolution of Article III cases or controversies,
the judiciary is less likely to intrude into the realm of legislative policy
making. 135 Accordingly, the Framers rejected the idea of creating a
Council of Revision that would have permitted federal judges to rule
on the constitutionality of proposed legislation, rejected the idea of
having the Chief Justice serve on an advisory Privy Council to the
President, and rejected the idea of authorizing the legislative and
executive branches to compel legal opinions from the Supreme
Court. 136 In addition to the advisory opinion prohibition--or, more
precisely, as specific instantiations of the advisory opinion
prohibition--other justiciability doctrines associated with the Article
III case or controversy provision seek to limit the courts to disputeresolution activities. These include the doctrines of standing, ripeness,
mootness, finality, the political question doctrine, and the prohibition
on collusive suits. 137 Similarly, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance
precludes federal courts from unnecessarily expounding the meaning
of the Constitution, if a dispute can be resolved without such
exposition. 138 In addition, the fact that courts invoke varying levels of
scrutiny to govern the degree of deference that they will accord the
representative branch actions presented to them further illustrates the
importance of insulating legislative policy making from judicial
interference. 139 In fact, some claims will never satisfy the Article III
justiciability requirements, thereby indicating that they have been
allocated by the Constitution to the political policy-making process
rather than the courts for resolution. 140
In a representative democracy, the goal of limiting the federal
judiciary to dispute resolution activities, rather than legislative policy134. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 72-73; Spann, supra note 10, at 589-90;
Note, supra note 12, at 2064, 2068-69.
135. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 72-73; Spann, supra note 10, at 632-36;
Note, supra note 12, at 2068-69.
136. See Spann, supra note 10, at 635.
137. See id at 617-18; see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 49, 72-73; Note, supra
note 12, at 2064 n.2.
138. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring); see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 76-80; Spann, supra note 10, at 591
n.19; Note, supra note 12, at 2064,2079 n.64.
139. See STONE ET AL., supra note 11, at489.
140. See sources cited supra note 66.
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making initiatives, is particularly important. The life tenure and salary
protections accorded the unelected federal judiciary are designed to
insulate the courts from political pressure in the resolution of
disputes. 141 However, this political insulation reduces the institutional
competence of the courts to engage in legislative policy-making
activities precisely because the courts lack direct political
accountability to any elected constituents. As a result, the Marbury
dispute-resolution model's prohibition on advisory opinions is
designed to minimize the countermajoritarian difficulties that would
be posed by judicial policy making. 142
B.

Tn'cameral Legislation

The problem with the Marbury model of judicial review is, of
course, that no one believes it. We are far more concerned with the
prospective impact of Supreme Court decisions than with the manner
in which they resolve the particular disputes before the Court. And we
expect the Court to be an active participant in the resolution of public
policy debates, rather than a passive umpire concerned only with the
application of existing constitutional rules to claims asserted by the
parties. It is, therefore, descriptively more accurate to conceptualize
the Supreme Court as the third chamber of a tricameral legislative
policy-making body than as a Marbury dispute-resolution tribunal.
The Supreme Court has always been more concerned with the
prospective effect of its decisions than with the retrospective resolution
of particular disputes. Marbmy itself was replete with the resolution
of legal issues-concerning who had what rights, and who was entitled
to what remedies-that could only have prospective effect, because of
the Marbury Court's own holding that it lacked jurisdiction to provide
a remedy in the case before the Court. And Marbury did this in the
143
process of establishing the prospective practice of judicial review.
One commentator has even argued that the Correspondence of the
Justl'ces-which prospectively prohibited the issuance of advisory
opinions-was itself advisory, because it did not arise out of a
particular case or controversy. 144 Moreover, the infamous decision in
Dred Scott v. Sanford-arising out of a dispute that the Court, once
141.
142.
143.
144.
could have
response.

See Spann, supra note 10, at 607-09.
See STONE ET AL., supra note II, at 43-51; cf. Spann, supra note 10, at 605-06.
See Spann, supra note 10, at 589-92.
See Note, supra note 12, at 2067 n.l4. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the Court
responded to the questions presented without issuing an abstract, prospective
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again, held it lacked jurisdiction to resolve-was designed to have the
prospective effect of protecting the institution of slavery and
145
prohibiting black citizenship.
In addition, some of the most famous contemporary Supreme
Court decisions can only be understood as prescribing prospective
legislative-type rules that were designed to regulate future conduct.
Miranda v. Arizona required law enforcement officials to begin the
well-known practice of reciting a statement of rights to criminal
suspects in order to ensure that any subsequent confessions would be
deemed voluntary. 146 And Roe v. H1zde articulated the type of trimester
rules for determining when future abortions could be regulated or
prohibited that we would normally expect to be prescribed by a
legislative body. 147 Moreover, recent cases like Camreta, al-Kidd, and
Davis strained the Article III case or controversy restriction for the
explicit purpose of providing prospective constitutional guidance that
148
was unnecessary to the resolution of disputes before the Court.
Current Supreme Court practice also seems skewed in favor of
prospective advisory guidance, with minimal attention being paid to
retrospective dispute resolution. The factors that govern the Court's
grant of certiorari focus heavily on splits between federal courts of
appeals, inconsistent decisions between federal courts of appeals and
149
state courts of last resort, and splits among state courts of last resort.
Such concern with the clarification of federal law is perfectly
understandable in the quest for prospective guidance, but it is largely
irrelevant for dispute-resolution purposes. 150 In addition, the questions
and hypotheticals that the Justices pose during oral argument often
seem more concerned with the prospective effect of various
contemplated rulings than with the best way to resolve the disputes
between the parties. 151 And the very existence of dicta, concurrences,
dissents, and separate opinions-which by definition do not resolve
disputes between the parties--can best be understood as efforts on the
part of Justices to provide guidance on how to limit, expand, or
145. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constjtutjonal amendment, U.S.
CaNST. amend. XIV; see Spann, supra note 10, at 609.
146. 384 U.S. 436,444-45 (1966).
147. 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973).
148. See supra Part II.
149. See SUP. CT. R. 10.
150. See Spann, supra note 10, at 613-17; see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 7280.
151. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 14-17, 19-24, 25-27, 33-48, 50-57,
Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011) (Nos. 09-1454, 09-1478).
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interpret the Court's present ruling in future cases. In fact, the practice
of issuing published opinions at all seems designed to have primarily
prospective effect. Disputes could be resolved by simple judgments,
with any descriptive elaboration necessary to explain the court's
reasoning distributed to the parties. Only the legitimacy thought to be
provided by the doctrine of stare decisis requires publication, but the
orientation of stare decisis is itself inherently prospective.
As discussed above, the fact that the Supreme Court often
appoints amici to argue cases where there is no longer a dispute
between the parties further illustrates the prospective focus of the
Court's attention. 152 This prospective-guidance rationale also explains
why the Court deems it advisable to review state court decisions
resolving questions of federal law, even when those decisions do not
satisfy the Article III requirements for federal jurisdiction that would
apply if the case had been commenced in federal court. 153 And it
explains why the Supreme Court sometimes issues alternative holdings
154
even though its decisions are not subject to reversal on appeal. The
focus on prospective guidance further helps to explain the Court's
practice of issuing rulings under the harmless error rule that it does not
apply to the litigants themselves, and the Court's prospective
announcement of new rules that are not applied to other cases pending
at the time of the Court's decision. 155 It also explains "hypothetical
jurisdiction" cases in which the Court resolves the merits of cases
rather than resolving more difficult threshold jurisdictional issues, as
well as decisions in which the Court resolves federal constitutional
issues despite the seeming existence of adequate and independent state
156
grounds that would alone resolve the dispute between the parties.
This prospectivity focus even explains why the Court has sometimes
gone so far as to resolve issues in uncertified "headless" class actions,
despite the fact that they have become moot with respect to the named
plaintiffs. 157
In addition to expecting prospective guidance from the Supreme
Court, we also expect the Court to be actively engaged in the
resolution of social policy issues. In fact, landmark Supreme Court
152. See supra text accompanying notes 114-115.
15 3. See supra text accompanying note 79.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 103-108; see also FALLON ET AL., supra note
12, at 55.
155. SeeFALLONETAL.,supranote 12,at54-55.
156. See id at 55-56; see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038-44 (1983)
(discussing adequate and independent state grounds).
157. See Spann, supra note 10, at 628-29 n.191.
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decisions, such as those identified above, tend to be viewed as
"landmark" precisely because they involved the Court in public policy
debates. Dred Scott inserted the Supreme Court deeply into the preCivil War slavery debate. 158 Miranda inserted the Court into the
criminal justice law and order debate.' 59 Roe inserted the Court into
the emerging feminist abortion rights debate. It has even been
suggested that the Court declined to issue the requested advisory
opinions in the Correspondence ofthe Justices in order to avoid taking
sides in a political controversy that might undermine the desire of the
160
Justices to be relieved of their obligation to ride circuit.
And, of
course, Marbwy itself grew out of an intensely political debate that
was at its core about the degree to which judicial review could be used
to retain partisan political power after a change in presidential
administrations.' 6 '
Our expectations of Supreme Court involvement in the public
policy-making process are especially strong where controversial issues
of social policy are at stake. Accordingly, Brown v. Board of
Education162 was not so much about whether Linda Brown could attend
a particular school in Topeka, Kansas, as it was about whether the
practice of southern school segregation should be viewed as consistent
with our mid-twentieth century conception of equal protection.' 63 And
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission' 64 was not so much
about whether a particular film could be shown prior to a particular
election, as it was about whether the twenty-first century First
Amendment should be understood as permitting significant corporate
influence over our electoral process. 165 It has become literally
unthinkable that controversial social policy debates over issues such as
affirmative action, school prayer, abortion, same-sex marriage, and
now the health care mandate could be resolved without significant
input from the Supreme Court.

158. See STONE ET AL., supra note II, at 449-56.
159. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-48 (I 966) (describing police
practices).
160. See JAY, supmnote 12, at 149-70; see also FALLON ET AL., supm note 12, at 52-53.
161. See STONE ET AL., supra note II, at 36-43.
162. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
163. See Spann, supra note 10, at 597-602.
164. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
165. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The 'Vevastating" Decision, N.Y. REv. BOOKS (Feb.
25, 20 I 0), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/201 0/feb/25/the-devastating-decision/;
cf Roy A. Schotland, The Post-Citizens United Fantasy-Land, 20 CORNELL J.L. & Pus.
POL'Y 753 (2011).

1330

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1289

The Supreme Court's pervasive involvement in the formulation of
prospective public policy suggests that the Court can be more usefully
conceptualized as a legislative body than as a dispute-resolution
tribunal. Rather than passively applying settled law to disputes
between the parties, the Court actively adopts and refines
governmental policies through the process of judicial review.
Accordingly, I have previously argued that the Court should be viewed
as the third branch of a tricameral legislature, because it makes
legislative-type social policy in much the same way that the political
branches of government do. The Court can be viewed as a third
legislative chamber that exists in addition to the House and the Senate,
or as a third policy-making branch of government that exists in
addition to Congress and the President. 166 Under either view of
Supreme Court tricameralism, the important point is that the process
of constitutional interpretation is so loosely constrained by textual
language, original intent, and constitutional theory that the Court is
required to make prospective policy determinations in order to give
operative meaning to constitutional provisions. 167
In fact, the policy-making latitude of the Supreme Court seems
roughly analogous to the policy-making latitude of the political
branches. Actions of the orthodox political branches are constrained
by political forces that emanate from constituent desires, whose
immediacy is mediated by the length of the term of office associated
with each political branch. Actions of the Supreme Court are similarly
constrained by political forces that emanate from the appointment and
confirmation process, and are similarly mediated by the longer term of
office associated with life tenure. That tends to make the Supreme
Court responsive to durable political interest groups, who are primarily
concerned with maintenance of the status quo, and who want their
preferences to be enshrined in constitutional principles. This, in turn,
dampens the effect of any redistributive efforts that might emerge from
the conventional political branches. However, the Court is ultimately
doing what it thinks will prospectively advance its vision of sound
166. See Girardeau A. Spann, Constitutional Hypocrisy, 27 CON ST. COMMENTARY 557,
561-64 (2011). Although the President is technically charged with the executive
implementation of legislative policies, the demise of the nondelegation doctrine and the rise
of the administrative state have given the President vast amounts of policy-making discretion
that is more legislative than executive in nature. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531
U.S. 457, 472-76 (200 I) (recognizing permissive nondelegation doctrine); PETER L. STRAUSS
ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMlNISTRATNE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 101-18 (rev.
lOth ed. 2003) (discussing constitutionality of administrative state).
167. See Spann, supra note 166, at 559-60.
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social policy. And that is the very same activity in which the
conventional political branches are engaged. 168 Accordingly, legislative
policies cannot be adopted without the concurrence of all three
chambers of our tricameral policy-making government-the House
and Senate chamber, the presidential chamber, and the third
prospective policy-making chamber that is lmown as the Supreme
Court.
The issuance of advisory opinions fits comfortably within this
tricameral legislative model of judicial review. Like conventional
legislation, advisory opinions are designed to implement prospectively
the social policies that they embody. That is precisely what happens in
Camreta-type situations, where advisory opinions in qualified
immunity cases tell government officials how they are to behave in the
future. Despite their legislative character, advisory opinions have also
been provided to political leaders by individual Justices in the past, and
several state and foreign courts are expressly authorized to issue
advisory opinions in the present. 169
Some commentators have suggested that a benign judicial
function is the provision of advisory guidance to the political branches,
precisely because that guidance will enhance the quality of legislative
170
policy making. Moreover, advisory opinions have been used to exert
a more intrusive influence on the legislative process by threatening a
judicial veto of unwanted actions favored by other political bodies, in
much the same way that political vetoes are threatened by the House,
Senate, and President when they seek to gain political leverage over
proposed legislation. The Roberts Court provided a striking example
of this sort of effort to gain political leverage over legislation in
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder,
when the Court in advisory dicta strongly suggested that it would hold
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional if Congress did not
act to modify its provisions.' 7 '
To make matters worse, the advisory opinion prohibition itself
may be legislative in nature. Some economic models of the legislative
process have suggested that even the refiisaf to issue advisory opinions
can create constitutional uncertainty that ends up giving the Supreme
Court more influence over the legislative process than it would have in
168. Seeidat561-64.
169. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 12, at 52-54, 58; JAY, supra note 12, at 1-112.
170. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1709,
1709-12 (1998).
171. See 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513 (2009).

1332

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1289

172

the absence of the advisory opinion prohibition. As a result, it seems
that the Supreme Court is destined to act as a legislative policy-making
body whether it issues advisory opinions or not. Because the
separation-of-powers-based Marbwy model of adjudication is
ultimately about preventing the Supreme Court from engaging in such
legislative policy-making activities, the very coherence of judicial
review is drawn into question by the prospective orientation of
Supreme Court adjudication.
IV. CONSTRUCTIVE INCOHERENCE

The Marbwy model limits judicial review to the necessary
incidents of retrospective dispute resolution. But what we actually
want the Supreme Court to do is issue the sorts of prospective policy
decisions that are more honestly captured by a legislative model of
judicial review. An insistence that the Court simultaneously adhere to
these two conflicting models renders our prevailing conception of
judicial review incoherent.
The question that naturally arises,
therefore, is why we do not restore coherence by simply choosing one
model over the other. I believe that we adhere to these conflicting
models in the hope that, by doing so, we can transcend a dilemma
inherent in liberalism itself-the simultaneous conception of ourselves
as autonomous liberal individuals who pursue pluralist self-interest,
and as other-regarding republican communitarians who pursue civic
virtue. Supreme Court mediation offers an escape from the tension
that exists between these two conflicting conceptions, by helping us to
avoid accountability for the selfish ways in which we treat each other.
However, recognition of the incoherence inherent in the demands that
we place on a liberal conception of judicial review may actually
promote accountability for our egocentric inclinations, and prompt us
to treat each other in more empathetic ways.

A.

Liberal Dilemma

Because we live together, rather than in isolation, each of us
experiences a constant tension between our own self-interests and the
conflicting interests of others. But because we are committed to
liberalism, we seek to dissipate that tension in ways that will privilege
individual liberty over collective welfare that could take the form of
oppressive collective coercion. Social contract theory attempts to
172. Note, supra note 12, at 2077-82.
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resolve this liberal dilemma by positing the existence of a mutual
agreement pursuant to which each of us relinquishes a limited portion
of individual autonomy in exchange for a corresponding
relinquishment of autonomy by other members of society. Thomas
Hobbes theorized that this relinquishment of liberal autonomy to the
sovereign grants the sovereign absolute power to protect us from the
mutually destructive forces that we would inflict on each other in a
state of nature, thereby enabling us to relate to each other safely and
productively in civil society. 173 John Locke envisioned a more
contingent nature of sovereign power. Because individuals agree to
impose natural law norms on themselves as terms of the social contract
into which they enter, he advanced a liberal conception of the
sovereign as an entity that is ultimately subject to the authority of the
contracting parties who have ceded the power necessary to create it.' 74
Duncan Kennedy used the term "fundamental contradiction" to
emphasize the internal, psychological dimension of the liberal
dilemma. Not just social circumstances, but individual identity itself,
is dependent on relationships with others-for example, employer,
friend, spouse, father, sister, lover. That gives others the power to
threaten not only an individual's material comfort, but to threaten an
individual's sense of self as well. Accordingly, the liberal dilemma
causes individuals both to seek out connections with others in order to
make themselves feel materially secure and psychologically complete,
and to reject connections with others in order to protect themselves
from the dangers that others pose to an individual's material and
psychological integrity. Individual autonomy is, therefore, ultimately
vulnerable to the coercive power of others, including the collective
coercive power on which Hobbes and Locke would rely to protect that
autonomy. In order for this tension to be successfully mediated, there
must be some reliable means of confining coercive social power to its
proper sphere. We tend to rely on courts to mediate the tension by
articulating doctrinal rules that offer liberal accounts of how social
power can properly be cabined. But to the extent that liberal theory
ends up simply masking hierarchical structures of social power, that
are based on things like social class or genetic endowments, we remain
mired in the liberal dilemma. 175
173. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Richard Tucked., 1996).
174. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION 1-210 (Ian Shapiro ed., 2003).
175. See Duncan Kennedy, The Structure ofBlackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L.
REv. 205,211-13,216-21,256-72 (1979). Kennedy has since suggested that the fundamental
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The tension between individual and collective interests that is
highlighted by the liberal dilemma also lies beneath debates about the
appropriate function of constitutional governance. Contemporary
liberal theories of constitutional law privilege personal liberty and
view the state as existing primarily to protect the rights of autonomous
individuals. Accordingly, sound governmental policy results from the
aggregation of individual preferences that emerge from the clash of
special interest factions in the pluralist political process. Under this
view, individual rights tend to be important as safeguards against
redistributive initiatives of the state that would threaten existing
property entitlements. 176 Classical republican theories of constitutional
law echo anti-federalist arguments that resisted adoption of the
Constitution. They are more communitarian than liberal in nature, and
they view the state as existing primarily to facilitate public deliberation
and the inculcation of civic virtue in citizens. Under this view,
individual rights are secondary to the collective welfare, which can
sometimes be advanced through redistributive efforts that promote
equality among citizens. 177 The Madisonian version of republicanism
that ultimately provided the basic architecture of the Constitution was
an effort to merge the practicalities of liberal pluralism with the
However, Madisonian
benefits of classical republicanism. 178
republicanism is itself sufficiently liberal that it remains vulnerable to
the individual-collective tension that lies at the heart of the liberal
dilemma.
I think that we are, understandably, trying to have it both ways.
We need to find some method of mediating the tension inherent in the
liberal dilemma, so that we can feel secure in our belief that the state
will protect us against the aggression of others but will not itself utilize
coercive state power to harm us. And we also want the freedom to
contradiction no longer serves a useful conceptual function, because it has become a reified
abstraction. He fears that people now simply invoke the concept to serve their own purposes
in philosophizing about law, thereby illustrating rather than negating its value as a caution
against false mediation and a preoccupation with analytical truth. See Peter Gabel & Duncan
Kennedy, Roll over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. I, 12-18, 24-25 (1984). My intent is to
make affirmative use of the liberal dilemma reflected in the fundamental contradiction as a
caution against the pursuit of analytical truth. But I suppose there is always the danger that I
am further domesticating the power of the concept.
176. SeeCass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L REv.
1689, 1689-95 (1984); see also STONE ET AL., supra note II, at 19-21, 24-29. See generally
STONE ET AL., supra note II, at 712-20 (discussing constitutional theory).
177. See STONE ET AL., supra note 11, at 12-14; Sunstein, supra note 176, at 1689-95.
See generally STONE ET AL., supra note 11, at 712-20 (discussing constitutional theory).
178. See STONE ET AL., supra note II, at 19-21, 24-26; Sunstein, supra note 176, at
1689-95.
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pursue our individual self-interests in a liberal pluralist manner, while
still thinking of ourselves as virtuous and other-regarding in a civic
republican sense. Stated more succinctly, we want both to be
compassionate citizens who are protected from the selfish aggression
of others, and to be the selfish others who are inflicting that aggression
on compassionate citizens.
Needless to say, these conflicting
preferences are difficult to reconcile. But we seem to be asking
judicial review to reconcile them for us.
B.

EnhancedAccountability

The Supreme Court's curious exercise of judicial review in
Camreta can be understood as an effort to legitimate a liberal status
quo by using the recognition of constitutional rights to mediate a
particular incarnation of the liberal dilemma. Close examination
reveals that the Court's effort is analytically inadequate to achieve this
objective-an objective that, of course, is ultimately unattainable. But
we have little incentive to engage in such close examination, precisely
because of its destabilizing effect on the perceived coherence of
judicial review. Nevertheless, a more mature appreciation of the
incoherence inherent in our liberal conception of judicial review might
cause us to accept more accountability for our individual and collective
actions, which in turn might cause us to treat each other more
empathetically.
Sarah's nine-year-old daughter S.G. confronted a dilemma.
Consistent with the terms of the Hobbesian-Lockean social contract,
she favored state protection of her individual autonomy from the threat
posed by adults who would subject her to sexual abuse. But she also
wanted the state to refrain from overriding her autonomy in a way that
would subject her to compelled governmental seizure against her will.
More subtly, S.G. is also likely to have confronted the psychological
dilemma highlighted by Kennedy's fundamental contradiction. She
almost certainly experienced conflicting desires to be connected with a
father whom she loved, and to be distanced from a father who
threatened her with sexual abuse. To make matters worse, S.G. may
have experienced additional conflicting emotions toward her mother,
as someone with whom she wished to connect as a source of
affectionate maternal security and to be distanced from as a force
seeking to manipulate her in ways that were designed to protect her
father from criminal prosecution. Liberal theory posits the existence
of a coercive state whose selective intervention will adequately
mediate these conflicting impulses. But if not properly mediated, these
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conflicting desires for state intervention and state nonintervention will
paralyze each other in a way that will be destabilizing for a liberal
theory of the state.
The existence of a Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures held out hope that Supreme Court
enforcement of that constitutional right could perform the needed
mediation function. By harmonizing S.G.'s competing interests in a
way that authorized state intervention only to the extent necessary to
protect S.G.'s autonomy-including her need for psychological
serenity-the Fourth Amendment guarantee could transcend the liberal
dilemma. Moreover, the imprecision inherent in the "reasonableness"
standard of the Fourth Amendment could be overcome through the
process of judicial review, where the Supreme Court could provide the
constitutional guidance needed for proper application of the Fourth
Amendment. Unfortunately, however, these are not tasks that judicial
review can perform coherently.
Leaving aside the difficult policy question of how the mere
"reasonableness" requirement of the Fourth Amendment could tell the
Court where to locate the proper crossover point between S.G.'s
conflicting autonomy interests, the Court would still have to find some
way to transmit its interpretation of the Fourth Amendment guarantee.
Child welfare officials would need to know what level of state
intervention was appropriate to protect S.G.'s autonomy, and
individuals like S.G. would need to believe that their autonomy was
being protected by the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Normally, the Court would do this by adjudicating
claims of Fourth Amendment violations. If the state violated a Fourth
Amendment right, the victim's autonomy could be protected with a
compensatory damage award, and the Court's opinion would provide
prospective guidance to others about the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. However, as the facts of Camreta show, that process will
not work in cases where the Supreme Court changes its interpretation
of where the Fourth Amendment crossover point is locatedsomething that the Court must do from time to time, in order to keep
pace with our evolving cultural maturation.
In novel Fourth Amendment cases, the Court would have to make
qualified immunity available to officials who relied on the Court's
prior interpretations of the Fourth Amendment. If the Court did notdo
so, those officials would be deterred from engaging in the proper level
of state intervention that was necessary to guard against child sexual
abuse, which in turn would leave individual autonomy insufficiently
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protected under the social contract. But once qualified immunity was
recognized, two distinct autonomy problems would arise. First, an
individual such as S.G. would have had his or her autonomy wrongly
deprived by the state with no ability to recover damages to compensate
for that deprivation. Second, from that point on, the Court would be
disabled from engaging in future Fourth Amendment exposition,
because Article III jurisdictional rules would preclude the Court from
addressing the merits of the Fourth Amendment in cases that could
thereafter be disposed of on qualified immunity grounds. As a result,
Fourth Amendment evolution would be arrested, and the proper
crossover point that established the evolving level of state intervention
needed to protect individual autonomy could no longer be ascertained
or transmitted. Therefore, the Court would no longer possess the
ability to mediate the liberal dilemma, and individuals would be left
fearing their return to a state of nature.
The Camreta Court tried to avoid this result by modifying its
Article III jurisdictional rules in a way that permitted the Court to
provide prospective Fourth Amendment guidance through the issuance
of advisory opinions in cases where qualified immunity applied, even
on appeals by prevailing parties. But that strategy simply confounded
the problem of establishing the proper crossover point by creating new
liberal autonomy problems of its own. Just as the absence of qualified
immunity would provide an incentive for state underintervention in the
protection of individual autonomy, the presence of qualified immunity
provides an incentive for state overintervention. Because officials will
not have to compensate individuals whose autonomy is interfered with,
the presence of qualified immunity is as likely to distort the Fourth
Amendment crossover point in one direction as the absence of
qualified immunity is to distort it in the other direction. But a more
serious problem emerges once one recognizes that the Article III
advisory opinion prohibition that the Court ignores in its quest to
provide constitutional guidance in immunity cases is itself a rule that
protects liberal autonomy.
One justification for Article III restrictions on federal court
jurisdiction lies in the recognition that judicial power is itself a form of
state power that can interfere with individual autonomy. Like the
Fourth Amendment, therefore, Article III jurisdictional rules also
establish a crossover point that is needed to harmonize the conflicting
needs of individuals to invoke judicial protection against incursions on
their autonomy by other individuals and to avoid incursions on their
autonomy by the judiciary itself. As a result, the advisory opinions
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that are necessary for the Fourth Amendment to establish the
appropriate liberal autonomy crossover point preclude Article III from
establishing the appropriate liberal autonomy crossover point. And
vice versa. Because the Court cannot both issue and refuse to issue
advisory opinions in the same case, it is once again difficult to see how
it could ever ascertain or transmit the level of state intervention that is
necessary to mediate the liberal dilemma. Undaunted, however, the
Camreta Court nevertheless attempted to do precisely that.
Although the Court was willing to authorize the issuance of
advisory opinions when needed to establish the proper Fourth
Amendment autonomy crossover point, it refused to issue a Fourth
Amendment advisory opinion in the Camreta case itself. That was
because the doctrine of mootness dictated that withholding a Fourth
Amendment advisory opinion was necessary to establish the proper
Article III autonomy crossover point. If this is to make any sense, it
must be because the issuance of some advisory opinions is necessary
to achieve the proper level of state intervention, while a prohibition on
other advisory opinions is necessary to achieve the proper level of state
intervention. But it is unclear how the Court could ever distinguish
between the two. The case or controversy provision of Article III does
not by its terms distinguish between different types of advisory
opinions-in fact, Article III does not mention advisory opinions at all.
And any effort to invoke a liberal theory of the state to distinguish
between mandatory and prohibited advisory opinions seems doomed
to fail. If the Court were to hold some individuals entitled to more
judicial protection of their autonomy than others-even though all
were involved in cases where advisory opinions were equally
unnecessary to the Court's decision-the Court would be
discriminating against similarly situated individuals in seeming
violation of the equality principle that is central to liberal theory.
As has been shown, the issuance of Fourth Amendment advisory
opinions is necessary to establish the level of state intervention
required to protect individual autonomy, but the Article III prohibition
on advisory opinions is also necessary to establish the level of state
intervention required to protect individual autonomy. That makes
Supreme Court efforts to mediate the liberal dilemma through judicial
review unlikely to be successful.
But things get even more
complicated once one realizes that individual autonomy is a two-sided
coin. Because autonomy claims are necessarily asserted in a social
context, protecting one person's individual autonomy will often leave
another person's competing autonomy unprotected.
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For example, in Camreta, the autonomy of the child welfare
officials was advanced by immunizing them from damage awards, and
by authorizing them to receive advisory guidance that would help them
perform their jobs more effectively. But those autonomy benefits to
the officials were obtained at the cost of S.G.'s own autonomy. S.G.
was unable to obtain damages for what the court of appeals held to be
a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. Moreover, because the
Supreme Court permitted the officials to appeal as prevailing parties,
S.G. was even deprived of the declaratory victory she won in the court
of appeals. Ironically, therefore, the autonomy of the child welfare
officials was preserved by denying the autonomy of the child whose
welfare was supposed to be protected. That not only illustrates a zerosum problem posed by competing demands for autonomy, it suggests
the existence of a problem inherent in liberal theory itself.
The autonomy benefits that Camreta granted to the child welfare
officials were not personal benefits. Rather, they were benefits that
the Supreme Court thought would make it easier for the child welfare
officials to do their jobs effectively. Although S.G.'s own autonomy
may have been denied, the Court presumably thought that its ruling
would advance the goal of protecting aggregate child welfare
autonomy in the future. Even in cases where the Court resolves
competing claims of purely private autonomy that do not involve
government officials, the Court presumably resolves the competing
claims in a way that it thinks will prospectively best protect aggregate
autonomy. But that begins to sound more like utilitarianism than like
standard liberal theory. Without getting embroiled in a debate about
whether liberalism and utilitarianism should ultimately be viewed as
resting on the same moral foundation, this observation does highlight a
tension present in liberal theory that has ramifications for judicial
review.
In mediating disputes, the Supreme Court acts as an arm of the
state. And a properly functioning liberal state has no interest in doing
anything other than protecting the individual autonomy of its citizens.
But competing autonomy claims of individuals will necessarily
generate conflict. And resolution of that conflict is the whole
justification for the state's existence under social contract theory in the
first place. Therefore, state interference with the autonomy of one
individual can always be justified by its corresponding protection of
the autonomy of another individual. As a result, judicial review can be
characterized as either always serving its liberal function of protecting
individual autonomy, or as never serving its liberal function of
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protecting individual autonomy. Once we realize this, the Court can
never successfully mediate the liberal dilemma in a way that saves the
coherence of a liberal conception of the state. It is not simply that the
appropriate level of state intervention to protect liberal autonomy is
overdetermined. It is that the appropriate level of state intervention to
protect liberal autonomy cannot be determined at all-because it does
not exist No level of state intervention can adequately protect liberal
autonomy, because the liberal dilemma is so fundamental that it simply
cannot be mediated.
All of this suggests that we should by now have recognized the
incoherence entailed in a liberal conception of judicial review, which
depicts the Supreme Court as simply a retrospective dispute-resolution
tribunal that is unconcerned with the prospective formulation of
legislative social policy. However, we continue to adhere to the
Marbury model despite the problems embedded in its liberal
foundations. I believe that we do so because judicial review helps to
mediate yet another destabilizing aspect of the liberal dilemma that we
would like to avoid. Just as judicial review helps us to suppress the
realization that we are both dependent on and threatened by the state in
our quest for individual autonomy, judicial review helps us to suppress
the realization that we are both perpetrators and victims in the state's
regulation of that autonomy.
We seem to be ambivalent about the political theory that we wish
to have embodied in our Constitution. We sometimes view ourselves
as pluralists who treat the Constitution as a document that is designed
to facilitate the formulation of democratic policy through the
aggregation of self-interested preferences in the political process. And
we sometimes view ourselves as other-regarding members of a
political community who treat the Constitution as a document that is
designed to facilitate the inculcation of republican civic virtue through
a collective deliberative process. Just as we rely on judicial review to
mediate the tension that exists between our conflicting autonomy
preferences, we also rely on judicial review to mediate the tension
between our conflicting liberal and communitarian inclinations. And
once again, we have an incentive to believe that judicial review can
serve this function, even in the face of its familiar coherence problems.
Realistically, we treat the Supreme Court as if it were a political
branch of a tricameral legislative policy-making body. We select
Justices based on their political and ideological beliefs. We focus on
their party memberships, religious affiliations, and abortion
sympathies during the nomination process. We float stories about their
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private club memberships and alleged sexual indiscretions during the
confirmation process. We attend to their prior opinions to ascertain the
planks in their political platforms, and we monitor the speeches and
campaign promises that they make-or withhold-in the hope of
winning election in the Senate.
Once confirmed, we try to influence a majority of the Justices to
vote in our favor by pitching arguments in our briefs that are designed
to appeal to their perceived political and ideological leanings. We then
form political coalitions to lobby the Court through the coordinated
submission of amicus briefs by special interest groups. We make oral
arguments that consist of carefully rehearsed talking points that were
previously vetted before coalition partners in moot court arguments.
When we win our cases, we praise the Court for reading the
Constitution in a manner that corresponds to our own ideological
preferences. And when we lose, we chastise the Court in our State of
the Union messages for overruling a century of constitutional
precedent.
With the arguable exception of direct campaign contributions, we
seem to treat the Supreme Court in the same way that we treat the
other political branches of government. We treat it as an institution
that should adopt our views, not because those views will advance our
collective welfare, but because those views will advance our own selfinterests in the ongoing struggle for dominance in the pluralist political
process. Such behavior is classically liberal, in that it satisfies the
selfish urge to place our own welfare above the collective welfare of
others. But this aspect of liberalism is not very pretty.
A competing civic republican vision of social policy making
seems to have more normative appeal. It posits the existence of a
Supreme Court that is more concerned with collective welfare than
with the bare aggregation of self-serving preferences. Under a civic
republican view, social policies emanate from the pursuit of civic
virtue rather than the pursuit of self-interest. As a result, the vision of
democracy encompassed by civic republicanism is other-regarding. Its
hope is to foster interdependence rather than liberal isolation. To that
end, it seeks to promote conditions of widespread education and
general economic security that will facilitate the common acquisition
179
of civic virtue. Robin West has argued that contemporary liberal
legal theory seems affirmatively to have excluded empathy for others

179. Seesupmtext accompanying notes 177-178.
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as a permissible consideration when pursuing the rule of law. 180 In a
civic republican society, however, individuals are characterized more
by their capacity for empathy than by their willingness to marginalize
the welfare of others in the name of objective legal liberalism. This
aspect of republicanism seems prettier. But, it also seems more
aspirational than realistic.
I think that we cling to the Marbury dispute-resolution model of
judicial review-despite the prospective legislative policy-making
function that we obviously desire the Supreme Court to servebecause the Marburymodel helps us to hide from ourselves the degree
to which we are simply liberal pluralists.
The Madisonian
Republicanism around which our Constitution is structured embodies
a compromise between classical liberalism and communitarianism that
is helpful in this endeavor. It allows us to treat the Court politically as
the legislative policy-making body that it is, but by having the Court
insist that it is merely resolving retrospective disputes between the
parties, we can believe that our political victories are actually victories
of constitutional principle. This allows us to think well of ourselves,
because we have contributed to the maintenance of our constitutional
order. It also allows us to dismiss even the empathetic appeal of
claims asserted by our opponents as themselves entailing nothing more
than demands for self-interested political concessions. We can dismiss
those competing claims precisely because the Supreme Court has
assured us that they are not rooted in constitutional principle. That, in
turn, allows us to exploit the interests of others for our own advantage
in a way that we might be reluctant to do without the assurance that we
were doing something more noble than merely advancing our own
self-interests. Accordingly, things like the maldistribution of wealth, or
the unequal distribution of resources over categories such as race,
religion, gender, and sexual orientation, bother us less than they would
without the buffer of Supreme Court constitutional legitimation.
Under the Marbury model, we are able to use judicial review to
mediate the liberal dilemma in a way that hides from us not only the
dark side of liberal autonomy, but the dark side of human personality
as well.
The reason I view the largely technical Supreme Court decision
in Camreta as important is that its reasoning forces the incoherence
inherent in judicial review to rise to the surface. Because the Court
180. See Robin West, The Ant1~Empathic Tum (Georgetown Pub. Law & Legal
Theory, Research Paper No. 11-97, 2011), avaJlable at http://papers.ssm.com/sol/3/papers.
cfrn?abstract_id= 1885079.
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strains so hard to honor the dispute-resolution model, while
simultaneously inventing new ways to circumvent it, the duplicity of
that model becomes easier to recognize than to deny. If we can no
longer hide behind the institution of judicial review to mask the degree
to which we are willing to do unpleasant things to each other, my hope
is that we will begin to resist the lure of liberalism. By focusing more
on our collective welfare than our individual preferences, we may
arrive at a postliberal stage of evolution in which we can begin to treat
each other with less hostility and more empathy. In that way, the
incoherence inherent in judicial review can turn out to be a form of
constructive incoherence that prompts us to question the appeal of
liberal theory itself.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court decision in Camreta is paradoxical. The
Court issues an advisory opinion authorizing itself to engage in the
formulation of prospective Fourth Amendment constitutional policy
that is not necessary to resolution of the dispute between the parties in
qualified immunity cases. But the Court goes on to hold that, because
the Camreta dispute between the parties has become moot, the Court
lacks Article III jurisdiction to issue an advisory opinion formulating
Fourth Amendment constitutional policy in that particular case.
However, if the Court lacked jurisdiction to issue an advisory opinion
resolving the Fourth Amendment issue in Camreta, it also lacked
jurisdiction to issue an advisory opinion authorizing itself to issue
advisory opinions in other cases.
The Camreta paradox is symptomatic of the incoherence that is
embedded in our conception of judicial review. We want the Supreme
Court to provide us with prospective constitutional guidance, but we
insist that the Court do so in the guise of retrospective adjudication that
merely resolves disputes between the parties. Because it is difficult to
imagine that the Court could depart from the traditional Marbury
dispute-resolution model of judicial review without also crossing the
line into legislative policy making, we are further insisting that the
Supreme Court pose the precise separation of powers danger that the
Marbury model of judicial review was designed to guard against.
The inconsistent demands that we place on judicial review reflect
a dilemma inherent in liberal theory. We want the state to protect
individual autonomy without itself interfering with that autonomy, but
in addition, we secretly want the state to help us deny the autonomy of
others in order to advance our own self-interests. In the process, we
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also want the Court to portray our pluralist political policy preferences
as if they were the products of our civic republican constitutional
principles. Our desire to have judicial review serve these inconsistent
functions is what makes judicial review incoherent, but the Marbury
model helps us to mask that incoherence from ourselves. I believe that
the Camreta paradox ought to be viewed as an opportunity to
highlight, rather than suppress, the incoherence of our prevailing
conception of judicial review. By confronting directly the manner in
which we often sacrifice the interest of those unlike ourselves in order
to advance parochial interests of our own, we may end up treating each
other with less harshness and more empathy. The danger is that we
will resist such self-revelation precisely because we are unwilling to
inhibit our continued ability to engage in the sorts of exploitation to
which we have grown accustomed-because we are inescapably
liberal. If that is the case, I am not sure how we could ever escape the
incoherence of judicial review. Alas, we would actually have to be the
civically virtuous, empathetic people that we now seem capable of
only pretending to be.

